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1The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, the Homeland Security Act of 2002, 
and the False Dichotomy between Protecting National Security 
and Preserving Grand Jury Secrecy
September 11, 2001—in the blink of an eye, buildings demolished, lives shattered, and 
the very institutions on which our nation was built shaken to their core.   One such institution, the 
federal grand jury, continues to reverberate from that day.  Long enshrined under the common 
law and more recently codified in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e), the doctrine of grand 
jury secrecy faces perhaps the most serious threat in its centuries-long history—a threat which 
need never have existed.
In response to the continuing danger posed by terrorism, Congress has amended Federal 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) to create unprecedented exceptions to the rule that matters 
occurring before a federal grand jury must not be disclosed.1 As part of a much larger plan to 
encourage the sharing of information by law enforcement and intelligence officials,2 a new 
exception to Rule 6(e) created by the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 facilitates the sharing of grand 
jury materials relating to intelligence matters with federal intelligence, immigration, defense, 
protective, and security officials.3 A second exception added by the Homeland Security Act of 
2002 authorizes the disclosure of grand jury materials relating to threats to national security,
such as terrorism and sabotage, to a wide array of officials, including foreign officials, for the 
purpose of addressing the threat.4  Neither of the new exceptions requires judicial approval of 
1 See infra notes 90 to 188 and accompanying text.
2 See infra notes 92 to 95 and accompanying text.
3
 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism 
(USA PATRIOT Act) Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 203, 115 Stat. 272, 279-80 (2001).  See infra notes 92 to 155 and 
accompanying text.
4
 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 895, 116 Stat. 2135, 2256-57 (2002).  See infra notes 156
to 188 and accompanying text.
2disclosures and neither requires a showing that a particularized need exists for the disclosure.
Challenges to the constitutionality of these exceptions are almost certain.5
Unlike many provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 and the Homeland Security 
Act of 2002, the provisions creating new exceptions to Rule 6(e) contain no sunset rule.6  The 
changes are permanent—they are not wartime security measures. Nonetheless, Congress has an 
obligation to revisit these crucial policy decisions made with haste in a time of national crisis.
Part I of this article describes the history of grand jury secrecy within the United States 
from its common-law beginnings to the most recent amendments to Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 6(e).7  Part II examines the relationship between the right of grand jury secrecy and 
the Grand Jury Clause of the Fifth Amendment, concluding that the right of grand jury secrecy
enjoys constitutional protection.8 Part III concludes that the newly created exceptions to Rule 
6(e) are at best bad public policy and at worst violations of the Grand Jury Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment.9   Finally, Part IV proposes an amendment to Rule 6(e) that would preserve a right 
valued for nearly a millennium and bring the new exceptions within constitutional limits without 
sacrificing national security interests.10
I.   A Brief History of Grand Jury Secrecy within the United States
The history of grand jury secrecy within the United States can be broken down into three 
distinct eras:  the common law era, the pre-9/11 rules era, and the post-9/11 rules era.
5
 Frederick P. Hitz, Unleashing the Rogue Elephant:  September 11 and Letting the CIA Be the CIA, 25 Harv. J.L. & 
Pub. Policy 765, 773 (2002).  
6
 The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 contains a sunset provision that makes the Act ineffective as of December 31, 
2005.  Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 224(a), 115 Stat. 272, 295.  However, the sunset provision specifically exempts section 
203(a), which amended Rule 6(e).  Id. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 contains sunset rules for a few 
provisions, e.g., Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 312(g), 116 Stat. 2135, 2176, but not the provisions which amend Rule 6(e).
The proposed Patriot Oversight Restoration Act, S. 1695, 108th Cong. (2003) would extend the Patriot Act’s 
Sunshine provision to include section 203(a).
7 See infra notes 11 to 188 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 189 to 292 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 293 to 384 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 385 to 391 and accompanying text.
3A. The Common Law Era
The “long-established policy” of protecting grand jury secrecy is “older than our nation 
itself.”11 A right to indictment by a grand jury journeyed to the New World with the English 
colonists,12 and “in this country as in England of old the grand jury has convened as a body of 
laymen, free from technical rules, acting in secret . . . .”13  For centuries, grand jury secrecy
enjoyed the protection of the common law.14
To understand the reasons for grand jury secrecy, one must understand the role of the grand 
jury proceeding.  Grand jury proceedings have traditionally served two functions:  investigating 
whether probable cause exists to believe a crime has occurred (i.e., the “sword” or 
“investigatory” function)15 and screening cases to shield innocent persons from unwarranted 
prosecution (i.e., the “shield” or “screening” function).16 Thus, grand juries serve both the
governmental interest in finding and punishing wrongdoers and the individual interest in 
avoiding the indiscriminate exercise of governmental authority. Although the grand jury was 
brought into being to serve the investigatory function,17  by the seventeenth century, the 
screening function had risen to prominence.18 Indeed, the screening function was viewed by the 
11
 Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. U.S., 360 U.S. 395, 399 (1959).  
12
 Costello v. U.S., 350 U.S. 359, 362 (1956).  See generally Mark Kadish, Behind the Locked Door of an American 
Grand Jury:  Its History, Its Secrecy, and Its Process, 24 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 1, 5-16 (1996).  The first regular 
American grand jury sat in the Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1635.  Richard D. Younger, The People’s Panel:  The 
Grand Jury in the United States, 1631-1941 6 (Brown U. Press 1963).  
13
 Costello, 350 U.S. at 362.  In the early English criminal courts, “if a grand juror disclosed to a person accused the 
evidence before the grand jury in his case, such grand juror became accessory to the crime, if it was a felony, and a 
principal, if it was treason . . . .”   In re Atwell, 140 F. 368, 370 (W.D.N.C. 1905), rev’d, Atwell v. U.S., 162 F. 97 
(4th Cir. 1908).  In the American courts, the punishment for disclosure came in the form of contempt proceedings.   
Goodman v. U.S., 108 F.2d 516, 519 (9th Cir. 1939)
14 See, e.g., id. at 520 (holding despite the lack of a statute or rule requiring grand jurors or grand jury witnesses to 
take an oath of secrecy, it was within the discretionary power of the courts to do so).  American courts often required 
grand jurors and witnesses to take an oath of secrecy.  Id. at 518-19.
15
 Susan W. Brenner and Gregory G. Lockhart, Federal Grand Jury Practice § 3.1 (West Group 1996).
16 Id. § 2.2.  
17 E.g., Younger, supra note 12, at 1.  
18
 “[U]nlike its English progenitor, the American grand jury originally began, not as an arm of the executive, but as a 
defense against monarchy. It established a screen between accusations and convictions and initiated prosecutions of 
corrupt agents of the government.”  Kadish, supra note 12, at 10.  
4nation’s founders as being of such consequence19 that it was incorporated into the Fifth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution.20
Given the functions served by the grand jury, it is easy to see why its proceedings must be 
conducted in private.21 Long before the discovery of the New World, grand jurors were required 
to take an oath of secrecy,22 and long before the War of Independence, governmental 
representatives were barred from jury deliberations.23 In 1681, John Somers, a noted scholar 
read on both sides of the Atlantic, outlined three reasons why secret proceedings serve the public 
good.24  One, if targets were aware of the grand jury proceedings, they might conspire to “hide 
their crimes.”25  Two, were targets to be made aware of the proceedings against them, they might 
flee.26 Either of these events would impede the investigatory function. Three, questioning 
witnesses privately and separately aids in discovering the truth,27 a goal vital to both the 
innocent target28 (i.e., the screening function) and the King29 (i.e., the investigatory function).
19 E.g., Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390 (1962) (“Historically, this body has been regarded as a primary security 
to the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive persecution; it serves the invaluable function in our society 
of standing between the accuser and the accused, whether the latter be an individual, minority group, or other, to 
determine whether a charge is founded upon reason or was dictated by an intimidating power or by malice and 
personal ill will.”).
20 See generally infra notes 189 to 292 and accompanying text.  By the end of the Revolutionary War “indictment by 
a grand jury had assumed the position of a cherished right.”  Younger, supra note 12, at 41.  
21
 For a more detailed explanation of the interests protected by grand jury secrecy see infra notes 211 to 227 and 
accompanying text.  
22
 Kadish, supra note 12, at 13.  
23 Id.
24 John Somers, The Security of English-Mens Lives, or the Trust, Power, and Duty of the Grand Jurys of England
44-55 (photo reprint 1979) (1681). 
25 Id. at 44.
26 Id. at 46.
27 Id. at 46-47 (“Yet the reason will be still more manifest for keeping secret the accusations and the Evidence by the 
Grand Inquest if it be well considered, how useful and necessary it is for discovering truth in the Examination of 
Witnesses in many, if not most cases that may come before them; when if by this Privacy Witnesses may be 
examined in such manner and Order, as prudence and occasion direct; and no one of them be suffered to know who 
hath been examined before him, nor what questions have been asked him, nor what answers he hath given, it may 
probably be found out whether a Witness hath been biassed [sic] in his Testimony by Malice or Revenge, or the fear 
or favour of men in Power, or the love or hopes of Lucre and gain is present or future, or Promises of impunity for 
some enormous Crime .”).
28 Id. at 49-52.
29 Id. at 53-55.
5Under the common law, the right of grand jury secrecy was qualified in the sense that it
could be overcome upon a showing that disclosure was “essential to the enforcement of the 
constitutional guaranties or to the protection, preservation, or enforcement of public or private 
rights.”30 The standard applied was stringent. Matters occurring before a grand jury were almost 
never subject to disclosure absent a showing of substantial need of some kind.31 A majority of 
the reported cases involved requests for disclosure by defendants seeking to contest an 
indictment,32 but disclosure was also sought by government attorneys desiring to use grand jury 
materials at trial33 and in other proceedings.34 Disclosure was permitted in only a handful of 
reported decisions.35
30
 McKinney v. U.S., 199 F. 25, 38 (8th Cir. 1912) (Sanborn, J., dissenting).
31 E.g., U.S. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 234 (1940) (“[A]fter the grand jury’s functions are ended, 
disclosure is wholly proper where the ends of justice require it.”) (emphasis added); U.S. v. Terry  39 F. 355, 
356 (D.C.Cal. 1889) (stating, “general rules or doctrines must in some cases give way; but exceptions to their 
application must be admitted with extreme caution, and on the clearest ground of their necessity, to secure 
substantial, and not merely technical, rights”); U.S. v. Farrington,  5 F. 343, 347 (D.C.N.Y. 1881) (“The rule which 
may be adduced from the authorities, and which seems most consistent with the policy of the law, is that whenever it 
becomes essential to ascertain what has transpired before a grand jury it may be shown, no matter by whom; and the 
only limitation is that it may not be shown how the individual jurors voted or what they said during their 
investigations, because this cannot serve any of the purposes of justice.”) (citations omitted).
In Atwell v. U.S., the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals departed from the rule of secrecy, holding that once the grand 
jury has issued an indictment and been discharged and the defendant has been taken into custody, grand jurors are 
no longer bound by an oath of secrecy.  162 F. 97, 98-103 (4th Cir. 1908).  The idea that the need for secrecy 
diminishes after the grand jury has completed its work gained some acceptance, e.g., Metzler v. U.S., 64 F.2d 203, 
206 (9th Cir. 1933), but the court’s holding that no requirement of secrecy remains, “seems to have made but slight 
impression upon the federal courts in disposing of many kindred questions” in the years following the decision.  
U.S. v. United States Med. Assn., 26 F. Supp. 429, 430 (D.D.C. 1939).
32 E.g., Shushan v. U.S., 117 F.2d 110, 113 (5th Cir. 1941) (upholding trial court’s denial of defendants’ plea to 
review sufficiency of evidence before the grand jury);  U.S. v. Central Supply Assn., 34 F. Supp. 241, 242-46 (N.D. 
Ohio 1940) (overruling defendants’ motion to release grand jury witnesses from their oath of secrecy to allow 
defendants to prepare for trial);  United States Med. Assn., 26 F. Supp. at 429-31 (granting government’s motion to 
strike defendant’s motion to elicit information from grand jurors relating to possible prosecutorial misconduct);  
U.S. v. Perlman, 247 F. 158, 161-62 (S.D.N.Y. 1917) (denying defendant’s motion to quash an indictment and 
concluding insufficient reason existed to warrant inspection of the grand jury minutes by the court or the defendant).
33 See, e.g., Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. at 233 (concluding the “use of grand jury testimony for the purpose 
of refreshing the recollection of a witness rests in the sound discretion of the trial judge”).
34 E.g., in re Grand Jury Proc., 4 F. Supp. 283, 283-85 (E.D. Pa. 1933) (addressing whether grand jury testimony 
could be used at a proceeding for the revocation of a beer permit).  See U.S. v. Corban, 127 F. 713, 721-22 (D. 
Mont. 1904) (permitting examination of grand jurors to determine if prosecutorial misconduct tainted the grand jury 
proceeding).
35 E.g., Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. at 231-34 (permitting court-authorized disclosure because “necessary or 
appropriate” for refreshing the recollection of a witness at trial.); in re Grand Jury Proc., 4 F. Supp. 283, 283-85 
(E.D. Pa. 1933) (permitting grand jury testimony to be used at a proceeding for the revocation of a beer permit); 
6Persons seeking disclosure bore the burden of showing a particularized need for 
disclosure—vague generalities did not suffice.36  For example, grand jury secrecy was “not to be 
set aside on every request or suggestion of the person indicted, but only when there [was] a 
probability of serious illegality.”37 Further, it was the duty of the court to determine if and when 
some other need outweighed the need for secrecy.38 Breach of the rule of secrecy was not taken 
lightly and could result in prosecution for criminal contempt.39
These basic policies continued with the adoption of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
6(e), which is discussed in the sections that follow.40
B. Rule 6(e) Before 9/11
Prior to the events of September 11, 2001, both the text of Rule 6(e) and its interpretation by 
the United States Supreme Court reflected “the orthodox view that all proceedings before the 
Grand Jury should remain secret unless extraordinary circumstances are present.”41
Farrington,  5 F. at 343-48 (recognizing the right of the court to remove the veil of secrecy to investigate 
prosecutorial misconduct before the grand jury).
36 E.g., Shushan, 117 F.2d at 113 (finding evidence that the grand jury was not presented direct testimony on a 
particular element was insufficient to justify reviewing the record of the proceedings because the element may have 
been established using circumstantial evidence); United States Med. Assn., 26 F. Supp. at 429-31 (refusing to review 
grand jury record based on the affidavit of a defense counsel that “he has been ‘informed’ by various defendants and 
‘believes’ that attorneys for the government presented irrelevant testimony to the grand jury, advised it as to the law, 
and requested and persuaded it to return the indictment”).
37
 Shushan, 117 F.2d at 113.  Accord Perlman, 247 F. at 161 (noting the right of the judge to inspect grand jury 
minutes “should be sparingly exercised, unless a strong case is made out requiring examination of the minutes in the 
furtherance of justice, or for the protection of individual rights”). 
38
 E.g., Schmidt v. U.S., 115 F.2d 394, 397 (6th Cir. 1940) (“Logically, the responsibility for relaxing the rule of 
secrecy and of supervising any subsequent inquiry should reside in the court, of which the grand jury is a part and 
under the general instructions of which it conducted its 'judicial inquiry.'”); Goodman, 108 F.2d at 521 (holding “the 
court may at any time in the furtherance of justice remove the seal of privacy from grand jury proceedings”);  
Central Supply Assn., 34 F. Supp. at 243 (“We all know that from earliest times the veil of secrecy was cast over the 
deliberations of the grand jury and they were not called upon to disclose what occurred during their deliberations 
except in a judicial inquiry directed by a court.”); United States Medical Association, 26 F. Supp. at 430 (finding 
only a court could release grand jurors from their oath of secrecy). But see Atwell , 162 F. at 101 (finding grand 
jurors were not bound to oath of secrecy “after presentment and indictment found, made public, and custody of the 
accused had, and the grand jury finally discharged”).
39
 Blalock v. U.S., 844 F.2d 1546, 1556-57 (11th Cir. 1988) (citing in re Summerhayes, 70 F. 769, 773-74 (N.D. Cal. 
1895)).
40 See infra notes 41 to 188 and accompanying text.
41
 U.S. v. Papaioanu, 10 F.R.D. 517, 518 (D. Del. 1950).
71. The Text of Rule 6(e)
In 1944, the common-law doctrine of grand jury secrecy was codified by the adoption of 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e). As adopted, Rule 6(e) stated:
Disclosure of matters occurring before the grand jury other than its 
deliberations and the vote of any juror may be made to the attorneys for the 
government for use in the performance of their duties.  Otherwise, a juror, 
attorney, interpreter or stenographer may disclose matters occurring before 
the grand jury only when so directed by the court preliminary to or in 
conjunction with a judicial proceeding or when permitted by the court at the 
request of the defendant upon a showing that grounds may exist for a motion 
to dismiss because of matters occurring before the grand jury.42
Despite the absence of an express provision permitting contempt as a remedy for unauthorized 
disclosure, the courts continued to view contempt as the proper sanction for persons removing 
the veil of secrecy.43
According to the Advisory Committee, the new rule “continue[d] the traditional practice 
of secrecy on the part of members of the grand jury, except when the court permits a 
disclosure.”44 Rulemakers seemingly never questioned the idea that this practice must continue; 
grand secrecy was part and parcel of the Criminal Rules from the preliminary draft.45 In the notes 
42
 Fed. R. Crim P. 6(e) (1976) (amended 1977).
43 E.g., U.S. v. Hoffa, 349 F.2d 20, 43 (6th Cir. 1965) (finding the proper sanction for unauthorized disclosure would 
be contempt); U.S. v. Schiavo  375 F.Supp. 475, 478 (D.C.Pa. 1974) (noting the proper sanction for unauthorized 
disclosure would be “to punish the offending party in a contempt proceeding); U.S. v. Smyth  104 F.Supp. 283, 
293 (D.C.Cal. 1952) (concluding a court has the inherent power to “discipline the attorneys, the attendants or the 
grand jurors themselves for breach of the secrecy surrounding the body.”  This practice was consistent with the 
intent of the rulemakers as expressed in the notes accompanying the early drafts of the Rule.  E.g., Fed. R. Crim. P. 
6 advisory committee’s note (Second Prelim. Draft 1944) (reprinted in Drafting History of the Felderal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure vol. IV, 20 (Madeleine J. Wilken & Nicholas Triffin eds. 1991)) (“Violation of this rule renders 
such person liable to contempt proceedings.”). 
44 Fed. R. Crim. P. 6 advisory committee’s note. Accord  U.S. v. Sells Eng’g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 425 (1983).
45
 Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c) (Prelim. Draft of Adv. Comm. 1942) (reprinted in Drafting History of the Felderal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure vol. I, 50 (Madeleine J. Wilken & Nicholas Triffin eds. 1991)).
8accompanying the early drafts of the Rule,46 the Committee specifically pointed to the 
justifications for secrecy set forth in United States v. Providence Tribune Co.,47 which warned:
Secrecy is essential to the proceedings of a grand jury for many reasons. Publicity 
may defeat justice by warning offenders to escape, to destroy evidence, or to 
tamper with witnesses. . . .Secrecy is also required in order that the reputations of 
innocent persons may not suffer from the fact that their conduct is under 
investigation, or has been investigated, by a grand jury. . . . Secrecy is further 
required for the protection of witnesses who may go before the grand jury, and to 
encourage them to make full disclosure of their knowledge of subjects and 
persons under investigation, without fear of evil consequences to themselves.48
The term “matters occurring before the grand jury” has been interpreted to 
encompass and protect a wide variety of materials.49
[It] includes not only what has occurred and what is occurring, but also what is 
likely to occur. Encompassed within the rule of secrecy are “the identities of 
witnesses or jurors, the substance of testimony” as well as actual transcripts, “the 
strategy or direction of the investigation, the deliberations or questions of jurors, 
and the like.”50
The basic idea is to prevent the disclosure of “anything which may reveal what occurred before 
the grand jury.”51 Among other things, grand jury records and transcripts are protected52 as is the 
testimony of witnesses.53  Reports which summarize or analyze materials presented to the grand 
jury are also protected.54
Under the original Rule 6(e), the sole exception to the requirement of judicial approval 
involved disclosure to “attorneys for the government for use in the performance of their duties.”  
46 E.g., Fed. R. Crim. P. 6 advisory committee’s note (Second Prelim. Draft 1944) (reprinted in Drafting History of 
the Felderal Rules of Criminal Procedure vol. IV, 20 (Madeleine J. Wilken & Nicholas Triffin eds. 1991)).
47
 241 F. 524 (D.R.I. 1917).
48 Id. at 526 (citations omitted).
49 See generally Brenner & Lockhart, supra note 15, at § 8.4.
50 In re Motions of Dow Jones & Co., 142 F.3d 496, 499 (C.A.D.C.1998) (quoting SEC v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 628 
F.2d 1368, 1382 (D.C.Cir.1980) (en banc); Fund for Constitutional Gov't v. National Archives & Records Serv., 656 
F.2d 856, 869 (D.C.Cir.1981)).
51 In re Grand Jury Matter  682 F.2d 61, 63 (3d Cir. 1982)
52 Brenner & Lockhart, supra note 15, at § 8.4.1.
53 Id. § 8.4.3.
54 Id. § 8.4.3.
9This exception (hereafter referred to as the “government-attorney exception”) was entirely 
consistent with the doctrine of grand jury secrecy for it was intended to allow disclosure to 
persons who were already entitled to be present in the grand jury room.55
In 1977, Rule 6(e) was amended to allow disclosure without judicial approval to “such 
government personnel as are deemed necessary by an attorney for the government to assist an 
attorney for the government in the performance of such attorney’s duty to enforce criminal 
law.”56 Rule makers justified the disclosure based on the inability of government attorneys to 
adequately conduct grand jury investigations without the help of additional government 
personnel.57 In a sense, the government personnel are merely extensions of the government 
attorney.58 Under this exception (hereafter referred to as the “law-enforcement exception”), such 
personnel are only permitted to use grand jury materials to assist the attorney in enforcing federal 
criminal law.59  The obligation of secrecy is imposed upon them, and any knowing violation of 
this obligation may be considered a contempt of court.60  Further, the government attorney is 
required to promptly notify the court of any disclosure and to specify the government personnel 
to whom disclosure was made.61
The 1977 amendment also expressly provided for the sanction of contempt for the 
unauthorized disclosure of grand jury materials.62  This provision was intended in part to “allay 
the concerns of those who fear that such prosecutorial power will lead to misuse of the grand 
55 Fed. R. Crim. P. 6 advisory committee’s note (“Government attorneys are entitled to disclosure of grand jury 
proceedings, other than the deliberations and the votes of the jurors, inasmuch as they may be present in the grand 
jury room during the presentation of evidence.”)
56
 Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(3)(A)(ii) (amended 2002).
57
 Fed. R. Crim. P. 6 advisory committee’s note.  
58 See generally S. Rep. 95-354, at 6 (July 20, 1977) (reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 527, 530) (“Attorneys for the 
Government in the performance of their duties with a grand jury must possess the authority to utilize the services of 
other government employees.”).
59
 Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(3)(B).
60
 Fed. R. Crim P. 6(e)(7).
61
 Fed. R. Crim P. 6(e)(3)(B).
62
 Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(2) (“A knowing violation of Rule 6 may be punished as a contempt of court.”).  The current 
version of this provision is found at Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(7). 
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jury to enforce non-criminal Federal laws.”63
In 1983, Rule 6(e) was amended to permit government attorneys to share grand jury 
materials with other federal grand juries.64  Again, this exception (hereafter referred to as the 
“grand-juror exception”) is not inconsistent with the doctrine of grand jury secrecy for the grand 
jurors to whom the information is disclosed are bound by their oaths of secrecy.65
Finally, in 1985, Rule 6(e) was amended to clarify that state and local government 
personnel are included within the definition of government personnel to whom disclosure by a 
government attorney is permitted.66  To additionally safeguard grand jury secrecy, rulemakers 
required the government attorney making the disclosure to warn the government personnel, 
federal, state, or local, of the obligation of secrecy.67
2.  U.S. v. Sells Engineering, Inc.68:  A Narrow Interpretation
Perhaps the most significant interpretation of Rule 6(e) was provided by the United States 
Supreme Court in United States v. Sells Engineering, Inc.69 In that case, the Court was asked to 
determine whether government attorneys working for the Civil Division of the Department of 
Justice could access grand jury materials for the purpose of preparing a civil suit.70  The 
Government first argued that as the attorneys for the Civil Division fell within the category of 
“attorneys for the government,”  such materials could be automatically disclosed under Rule 
6(e)(3)(A)(i), the government-attorney exception.71  The Court agreed that attorneys for the Civil 
63
 S. Rep. 95-354, at 8 (1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 527, 531).
64
 Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(3)(C)(iii) (2000) (current version at Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(3)(C)).
65
 Fed. R. Crim. P. 6 advisory committee’s note.
66
 Fed. R. Crim P. 6(e)(3)(A)(ii) (amended 2002).
67
 Fed. R. Crim P. 6(e)(3)(B).  
68
 463 U.S. 418.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 420.
71 Id. at 427.  
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Division do fall within the class of “attorneys for the government.”72  Nonetheless, the Court 
concluded that the Government was not entitled to automatic disclosure.73  Specifically, the 
Court held that “[t]he policies of Rule 6 require that any disclosure to attorneys other than 
prosecutors be judicially supervised rather than automatic.”74
In so holding, the Court noted that the government-attorney exception only permits 
disclosure “‘in the performance of such attorney’s duty.’”75  Ultimately, it concluded that
“preparation of a civil suit by a Justice Department attorney who had no part in conducting the 
related criminal prosecution” does not fall within that category of duties covered by the 
exception.76  The Court’s decision to narrowly interpret Rule 6(e)’s government-attorney
exception was driven by “the strong historic policy of preserving grand jury secrecy.”77  It found
“disclosure for civil use unjustified by the considerations supporting prosecutorial access”—in 
sum, grand juries can function perfectly well without such disclosure.78
But the Court did not end its analysis with this finding.  It took great pains to articulate
the “affirmative mischief” such disclosure could cause.79 The Court was greatly concerned by 
the prospect that broad disclosure would increase “the risk of inadvertent or illegal release to 
others” and “render[] considerably more concrete the threat to the willingness of witnesses to 
come forward and to testify fully and candidly.”80  It also expressed concern for “the integrity of 
72 Id. at 427-28 (noting “Rule 54(c) defines the phrase expansively, to include authorized assistants to the Attorney 
General”; 28 U.S.C. § 515(a) provides that the Attorney General may direct any attorney employed by the 
Department to conduct ‘any king of legal proceeding, civil or criminal, including grand jury proceedings . . . .’”).
73 Id. at 435.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 428.  
76 Id. at 428-35.
77 Id. at 428.
78 Id. at 431.
79 Id. at 431.
80 Id. at 432.
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the grand jury itself,” fearing that the institution might be used for purposes other than criminal 
investigation and that such misuse might be difficult to ascertain.81
The Government also sought disclosure under then Rule 6(e)(3)(c)(i),82 which permitted 
court-ordered disclosure “‘preliminary to or in connection with a judicial proceeding.’”83  In so 
doing, the Government sought to distinguish cases involving disclosure to government officials 
from those involving private parties, arguing that when government officials seek disclosure “‘in 
furtherance of their responsibility to protect the public weal,’” they should not be required to 
make a showing of particularized need.84  At the heart of the Government’s argument was the 
idea that “‘disclosure of grand jury materials to government attorneys typically implicates few, if 
any, of the concerns that underlie the policy of grand jury secrecy.’”85 While acknowledging 
that the Government’s argument had “some validity,” the Court found it to be “overstated,”86 and 
refused to waive application of the particularized-need standard to government officials.87
Thus, prior to the events of 9/11, the only persons to whom grand jury materials could be 
disclosed without prior judicial approval were government attorneys involved in federal criminal 
investigations, government personnel assisting government attorneys in federal criminal 
investigations, and federal grand jurors.  Each of these groups is essential to the functioning of a 
81 Id. at 432-33.  A third concern was that the “use of grand jury materials by government agencies in civil or 
administrative settings threatens to subvert the limitations applied outside the grand jury context on the 
Government’s power of discovery and investigation.”  Id. at 433.
82
 This exception is currently contained in Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(3)(E)(i).
83 Id. at 442.
84 Id. at 443.  Specifically, the Government sought to avoid the application of the standard articulated in Douglas 
Oil:
“Parties seeking grand jury transcripts under Rule 6(e) must show that the material they seek is 
needed to avoid a possible injustice in another judicial proceeding, that the need for disclosure is 
greater than the need for continued secrecy, and that their request is structured to cover only 
material so needed. . . .”
Id. at 443 (quoting Douglas Oil Co. of California v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 222-23 (1979) 
(citations omitted)).  
85 Id. at 444-45.
86 Id. at 445.
87 Id. at 444-45.  The Court did note that “the standard itself accommodates any relevant considerations, peculiar to 
government movants, that weigh for or against disclosure in a given case.”  Id. at 445.
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federal grand jury and each has an obligation of secrecy under Rule 6(e)(2).88 All others seeking 
disclosure, including government officials, were required to obtain judicial approval by making a 
showing of particularized need.89
88
 On September 11, 2001, Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure read as follows:
(e) Recording and disclosure of proceedings.
(1) Recording of proceedings. All proceedings, except when the grand jury is deliberating or 
voting, shall be recorded stenographically or by an electronic recording device. An unintentional 
failure of any recording to reproduce all or any portion of a proceeding shall not affect the validity 
of the prosecution. The recording or reporter's notes or any transcript prepared therefrom shall 
remain in the custody or control of the attorney for the government unless otherwise ordered by 
the court in a particular case.
(2) General rule of secrecy. A grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a 
recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the government, or 
any person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (3)(A)(ii) of this subdivision shall not 
disclose matters occurring before the grand jury, except as otherwise provided for in these rules. 
No obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule. A 
knowing violation of Rule 6 may be punished as a contempt of court.
(3) Exceptions.
 (A) Disclosure otherwise prohibited by this rule of matters occurring before the grand jury, 
other than its deliberations and the vote of any grand juror, may be made to--
(i) an attorney for the government for use in the performance of such attorney's duty; and
(ii) such government personnel (including personnel of a state or subdivision of a state) as 
are deemed necessary by an attorney for the government to assist an attorney for the government 
in the performance of such attorney's duty to enforce federal criminal law.
 (B) Any person to whom matters are disclosed under subparagraph (A)(ii) of this paragraph 
shall not utilize that grand jury material for any purpose other than assisting the attorney for the 
government in the performance of such attorney's duty to enforce federal criminal law. An 
attorney for the government shall promptly provide the district court, before which was impaneled 
the grand jury whose material has been so disclosed, with the names of the persons to whom such 
disclosure has been made, and shall certify that the attorney has advised such persons of their 
obligation of secrecy under this rule.
 (C) Disclosure otherwise prohibited by this rule of matters occurring before the grand jury 
may also be made--
(i) when so directed by a court preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding;
(ii) when permitted by a court at the request of the defendant, upon a showing that grounds 
may exist for a motion to dismiss the indictment because of matters occurring before the grand 
jury; or
(iii) when the disclosure is made by an attorney for the government to another federal grand 
jury; or
(iv) when permitted by a court at the request of an attorney for the government, upon a 
showing that such matters may disclose a violation of state criminal law, to an appropriate official 
of a state or subdivision of a state for the purpose of enforcing such law.
 If the court orders disclosure of matters occurring before the grand jury, the disclosure shall be 
made in such manner, at such time, and under such conditions as the court may direct.
 (D) A petition for disclosure pursuant to subdivision (e)(3)(C)(i) shall be filed in the district 
where the grand jury convened. Unless the hearing is ex parte, which it may be when the petitioner 
is the government, the petitioner shall serve written notice of the petition upon (i) the attorney for 
the government, (ii) the parties to the judicial proceeding if disclosure is sought in connection with 
such a proceeding, and (iii) such other persons as the court may direct. The court shall afford those 
persons a reasonable opportunity to appear and be heard.
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C.    Rule 6(e) After 9/11
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 changed lives and laws.  Within fifteen 
months after the attacks, Congress had enacted two massive pieces of legislation aimed at 
addressing the terrorist threat: the USA PATRIOT Act of 200190 and the Homeland Security Act 
of 2002.91  Each significantly amended the provisions of Rule 6(e).   
1.   The USA PATRIOT Act Amendments
As an immediate response to the tragic events of 9/11, Congress enacted sweeping 
legislation in the form of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, intended to “deter and punish terrorist 
acts in the United States and around the world, to enhance law enforcement investigatory tools, 
and for other purposes.”92  A key function of the legislation was to break down the traditional 
 (E) If the judicial proceeding giving rise to the petition is in a federal district court in another 
district, the court shall transfer the matter to that court unless it can reasonably obtain sufficient 
knowledge of the proceeding to determine whether disclosure is proper. The court shall order 
transmitted to the court to which the matter is transferred the material sought to be disclosed, if 
feasible, and a written evaluation of the need for continued grand jury secrecy. The court to which 
the matter is transferred shall afford the aforementioned persons a reasonable opportunity to 
appear and be heard.
(4) Sealed indictments. The federal magistrate judge to whom an indictment is returned may 
direct that the indictment be kept secret until the defendant is in custody or has been released 
pending trial. Thereupon the clerk shall seal the indictment and no person shall disclose the return 
of the indictment except when necessary for the issuance and execution of a warrant or summons.
(5) Closed hearing. Subject to any right to an open hearing in contempt proceedings, the court 
shall order a hearing on matters affecting a grand jury proceeding to be closed to the extent 
necessary to prevent disclosure of matters occurring before a grand jury.
(6) Sealed records. Records, orders and subpoenas relating to grand jury proceedings shall be 
kept under seal to the extent and for such time as is necessary to prevent disclosure of matters 
occurring before a grand jury.
89
 The requirement that a person seeking disclosure of grand jury materials establish a “particularized need” also 
applies when a defendant seeks disclosure pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(3)(C)(ii).  E.g., U.S. v. Broyles, 37 F.3d 
1314, 1318 (8th Cir.1994).  Accord Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. U.S., 360 U.S. 395, 400 (1959) (applying the 
original version of Rule 6(e) and concluding, “the burden . . .  is on the defense to show that 'a particularized need' 
exists for the [grand jury] minutes which outweighs the policy of secrecy”).
90 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism 
(USA PATRIOT Act) Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 203, 115 Stat. 272, 272 (2001).
91
 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 895, 116 Stat. 2135, 2256-57 (2002).
92 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism 
(USA PATRIOT Act) Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 203, 115 Stat. 272, 272 (2001).
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barriers between federal law enforcement officials and the intelligence community.93 Bipartisan 
support existed for the idea that increased cooperation between law enforcement and the 
intelligence community was vital to preventing future terrorist acts.94  In the words of Senator 
Orrin Hatch, “In this new war, terrorists are a hybrid  between domestic criminals and 
international agents. We must lower the barriers that discourage our law enforcement and 
intelligence agencies from working together to stop these terrorists. These hybrid criminals call 
for new, hybrid tools.”95  In a span of less than eighteen months, these tools were integrated into 
the war on terrorism.
a. The Amendment of Rule 6(e)
The USA PATRIOT Act included a provision amending Rule 6(e) to allow96 disclosure of 
grand jury materials without judicial approval:97
when the matters involve foreign intelligence or counterintelligence (as defined in 
section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a)),98 or foreign 
intelligence information (as defined in clause (iv) of this subparagraph),99 to any 
93 See generally Jim McGee, An Intelligence Giant in the Making;  Anti-Terrorism Law Likely to Bring Domestic 
Apparatus of Unprecedented Scope, The Washington Post AO4, A04 (Nov. 11, 2001).
94 E.g., 147 Cong. Rec. S10560 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 2001) (statement of Senator Orrin Hatch); id. at S10556 
(statement of Senator Patrick Leahy) (noting “few would disagree that information learned in a criminal 
investigation that is necessary to combating terrorism or protecting the national security ought to be shared with the 
appropriate intelligence and national security officials”).
95 Id. at S10560.
96
 Under the new provision disclosure “may” be made.  Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(3)(A)(amended 2002) (current version 
at Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(3)(D)).  Disclosure is not required.  But see infra notes 116 to 122 and accompanying text.
97
 The House of Representatives’ version of this bill would have required judicial intervention.  H.R. Rpt. 107-
236(I), 107th Cong., 1st Sess., § 353 (Oct. 11, 2001).  
98
  “The term ‘foreign intelligence’ means information relating to the capabilities, intentions, or activities of foreign 
governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities.”  50 
U.S.C. § 401a(2) (2000 & Supp. I 2002). “The term ‘counterintelligence’ means information gathered and activities 
conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on 
behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international 
terrorist activities.”  Id. § 401a(2).  
99
 Clause (iv) defines “foreign intelligence information” as meaning:
(I) information, whether or not concerning a United States person, that relates to the ability of the 
United States to protect against--
(aa) actual or potential attack or other grave hostile acts of a foreign power or an agent of 
a foreign power;
(bb) sabotage or international terrorism by a foreign power or an agent of a foreign 
power; or
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Federal law enforcement, intelligence, protective, immigration, national defense, 
or national security official in order to assist the official receiving that information 
in the performance of his official duties.”100
Congress included this provision based on the belief that in the course of criminal 
investigations, grand juries might well obtain information that could be used to prevent 
terrorist acts.101  However, the definitions used seem to encompass a much broader range 
of information, including information that is unrelated to any threat to the United States 
or its citizens.  For instance, “foreign intelligence” includes information relating to the act 
of a foreign person.102  That could include the plans a foreign citizen to take part in a 
peaceful protest here or abroad or to buy a loaf of bread.
An argument exists that this new exception (hereafter referred to as the “PATRIOT 
intelligence exception”) significantly undermines the doctrine of grand jury secrecy.103 It differs
from other exceptions to Rule 6(e) secrecy in two critical respects.  First, the PATRIOT 
intelligence exception permits prosecutors, acting solely on their own authority, to disclose grand 
jury materials to persons who are not involved in the prosecution of federal crimes.104  Unlike 
(cc) clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service or network of a foreign 
power or by an agent of foreign power; or
(II) information, whether or not concerning a United States person, with respect to a foreign power 
or foreign territory that relates to--
(aa) the national defense or the security of the United States; or
(bb) the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States.
100
 Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(3)(C)(i)(V) (amended 2002) (current version at Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(3)(D)).
101
 For example, during the floor debate, Senator Bob Graham provided the following hypothetical:
Let me give a couple of hypothetical but eerily-close-to-reality examples. It is likely that there are, 
tonight, grand juries meeting at various places in the United States to deal with issues related to 
the events of September 11. Witnesses may be providing information-information about training 
camps in Afghanistan, ground warfare techniques used by al-Qaida and the Taliban, the types and 
quantity of weapons available. This type of information will be critical for the military-critical for 
the military now, not 2 years from now when these cases might go to trial.
147 Cong. Rec. at S10566 (statement of Senator Bob Graham).
102 See supra note 98.  
103
 Irvin B. Nathan & Christopher D. Man, The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 Poses a New Threat to Grand Jury 
Secrecy, 9 Bus. Crimes Bull. 1, 1 (February 2002).
104 Id. 
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those traditional exceptions granting prosecutors the right to disclose grand jury materials,105 this 
exception is not necessary to the proper functioning of the grand jury itself. The function of a 
grand jury is to determine whether probable cause exists to believe that a crime has occurred,106
not to determine whether a crime will or might occur in the future.  Under the traditional 
exceptions, a prosecutor might, for example, instruct an FBI agent to obtain physical evidence 
for submission to the grand jury.  To achieve the legitimate goal of obtaining the additional 
evidence needed by the grand jury to reach a just result, the prosecutor might find it necessary to 
disclose grand jury materials to the agent.  In short, the disclosure would be made with the intent 
to serve the grand jury.
The purpose of the new exception is fundamentally different.  Under the PATRIOT 
intelligence exception, a prosecutor might, for example, report the existence of a financial link 
between a recent immigrant and a suspected terrorist to an immigration official.  The 
immigration official would not be working for the prosecutor and would not be expected to 
report back to the grand jury. Instead, he or she might use the information as part of a 
deportation proceeding.  In sum, the disclosure of the information would be completely unrelated 
to the functioning of the grand jury.
Unlike those traditional exceptions authorizing disclosure for purposes unrelated to the 
grand jury function,107 this exception requires no judicial intervention and no showing of 
particularized need.  Even as the USA Patriot Act was being enacted, Congressional concerns 
over the lack of judicial oversight were voiced,108 but Congress’ desire to take swift, decisive 
action to prevent another 9/11 outweighed concerns over the Act’s individual components.  
105 See supra notes 55 to 67 and accompanying text.
106
 Brenner & Lockhart, supra note 15, at § 3.1.
107 See supra notes 68 to 89 and accompanying text.
108
 147 Cong. Rec. at S10556 (statement of Senator Bob Graham).
18
Second, the PATRIOT intelligence exception provides grand jury information to persons 
who are not subject to the same obligation of secrecy imposed upon the other categories of 
persons to whom grand jury materials may be disclosed without judicial intervention.  Pursuant 
to Rule 6(e)(2)(B), grand jurors, attorneys for the government, and persons to whom disclosure is 
made under the law-enforcement exception are not permitted to disclose matters occurring before 
the grand jury, except as otherwise provided for in the rules.  So, for instance, an FBI agent who 
receives grand jury materials pursuant to the law-enforcement exception109 is not empowered to 
pass along those materials to other persons.
The obligation of secrecy imposed by Rule 6(e)(2) does not apply to persons obtaining 
information under the PATRIOT intelligence exception.  Instead, Rule 6(e)(3)(D)(i), provides 
that federal officials receiving information under the new exception “may use the information 
only as necessary in the conduct of that person's official duties subject to any limitations on the 
unauthorized disclosure of such information.”110 The USA Patriot Act provided no explicit 
sanction for officials who violate this limitation.111  Indeed, as a practical matter, the prospects of 
identifying persons in violation are poor for no record of those receiving information is filed with 
the court overseeing the grand jury.112
b. The Adoption of Information-Sharing Guidelines
109 Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(3)(A)(ii).
110 See also 50 U.S.C. § 403-5d (Supp. I 2002) (authorizing the sharing of foreign intelligence and 
counterintelligence information “obtained as part of a criminal investigation” with federal intelligence officials, etc. 
and mandating that such information be used “only as necessary in the conduct of the person’s official duties subject 
to any limitations on the unauthorized disclosure of such information”).
111
 A court might attempt to rely upon its inherent powers to order a contempt sanction.  See supra notes 39, 43 and 
accompanying text.
112 Rule 6(e)(3)(D)(ii) merely requires that “within a reasonable time after such disclosure, an attorney for the 
government shall file under seal a notice with the court stating the fact that such information was disclosed and the 
departments, agencies, or entities to which the disclosure was made.”  Its failure to require prosecutors to 
specifically identify the federal officials to whom disclosure is made contrasts sharply with the requirement that 
government personnel to whom disclosure is made pursuant to Rule 6(e)(3)(A)(ii) be identified.  Fed. R. Crim. P. 
6(e)(3)(B). 
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Congress did provide a mechanism for limiting disclosure.113  Section 905(a) of the USA 
PATRIOT Act required the Attorney General to develop guidelines for the sharing of 
information by federal law enforcement agencies with the federal intelligence community.114
These guidelines were to be promulgated after consultation with the Director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency.115
On September 23, 2002, Attorney General John Ashcroft issued the required 
guidelines.116  The new guidelines do little to safeguard grand jury secrecy.  If anything, they 
make it more likely that grand jury materials will be disclosed.  While the PATRIOT intelligence 
exception117 permits disclosure to federal intelligence officials, “these guidelines require
expeditious disclosure.”118
113




 Memo, from John Ashcroft, U.S. Atty. Gen., to Heads of Dept. of Just. Components & Heads of Fed. Depts. & 
Agencies with L. Enforcement Resps., Guidelines Regarding Disclosure to the Director of Central Intelligence and 
Homeland Security Officials of Foreign Intelligence Acquired in the Course of a Criminal Investigation (Sept. 23, 
2002).
117 Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(3)(D). 
118
 Memo, from John Ashcroft, supra note 116, at Guideline 2 (emphasis added).  Specifically Guideline 2 states:
Law Enforcement Information Subject to Mandatory Disclosure. Subject to any exceptions 
established by the Attorney General in consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence (the 
"Director") and the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security, section 905(a) and these 
guidelines require expeditious disclosure to the Director, the Assistant to the President for 
Homeland Security or other members of the U.S. intelligence community or homeland security 
agencies as are designated under paragraph 4, infra, of foreign intelligence acquired in the course 
of a criminal investigation conducted by Federal Law Enforcement Agencies.
a. As used herein, the term “foreign intelligence” is defined in section 3 of the National Security 
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. § 401a) as: “information relating to the capabilities, intentions, or 
activities of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign 
persons, or international terrorist activities.”
b.  The term “section 905(a) information” means foreign intelligence acquired in the course of a 
criminal investigation.
c.  Section 203(d) of the USA PATRIOT Act, provides that: “Notwithstanding any other law, it 
shall be lawful for foreign intelligence or counterintelligence (as defined in section 3 of the 
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. § 401a)) or foreign intelligence  information 
obtained as part of a criminal investigation to be disclosed to any Federal law enforcement, 
intelligence, protective, immigration, national defense, or national security official in order to 
assist the official receiving that information in the performance of his official duties." Thus, no 
other Federal or state law operates to prevent the sharing of such information so long as 
disclosure of such information will assist the Director and the Assistant to the President for 
Homeland Security in the performance of their official duties, and Federal Law Enforcement 
20
The guidelines do allow for “exemptions from the mandatory disclosure obligation.”119
Requests for exemption “must be submitted by the department, component or agency head in 
writing [i.e., the United States Attorney] with a complete description of the facts and 
circumstances giving rise to the need for an exception and why lesser measures such as use 
restrictions are not adequate.”120  The Attorney General makes the final determination as to 
whether an exemption is warranted.121 Exemptions are considered on a case-by-case basis.122
The standard created by the guidelines is a mirror opposite of that applied in every other 
situation involving prosecutorial release of grand jury materials.  Instead of a presumption of 
secrecy, a presumption of disclosure exists.  Rather than requiring a particularized showing of 
the need for disclosure, the guidelines require a particularized showing of the need for secrecy.
The guidelines also allow for the “originator” of the information to place some 
restrictions on its use.123 As a general rule, information disclosed under the guidelines will be 
disclosed “free of any originator controls or information use restrictions.”124  However, use of 
grand jury materials may be restricted “to comply with notice and record keeping requirements 
and to protect sensitive law enforcement sources and ongoing criminal investigations and 
prosecutions.”125  Any restrictions on use “shall be no more restrictive than necessary to 
accomplish the desired effect.”126  Unless the information contained within the grand jury 
Agencies shall, notwithstanding any other law, expeditiously disclose to the Recipients (as 
defined below) section 905(a) information.
119 Id. Guideline 9.
120 Id. Guideline 9(c).
121 Id. Guideline 9(b).  In making this determination, the Attorney General is to consult with the Director of the 
Central Intelligence Agency and the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security.  Id.
122 Id.
123 Id. Guideline 8.
124 Id.Guideline 8(a).
125 Id.Guideline 8(c).
126 Id. Guideline 8(b)(i).
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materials relates to potential terrorism or weapons of mass destruction, the prosecuting official 
assigned to the case must be consulted prior to disclosure.127
Again, this standard runs counter to that applied to every other prosecutorial release of 
grand jury materials.  In the absence of use restrictions, as long as the recipients of the materials
believe that disclosure is necessary in the conduct of their duties, they are free to pass them along 
to anyone.128 This “second generation” of recipients did not exist under the exceptions in 
existence prior to 9/11.  Those who received grand jury materials from a prosecutor were 
prohibited by their own obligation of secrecy from disclosing them to a second generation of 
recipients.129  Neither Rule 6(e) nor the guidelines purport to limit the use of grand jury materials 
by second generation recipients.  Once they reach this point, any pretext of secrecy is a thing of 
the past.
One other feature of the guidelines is worthy of note.  The Attorney General has 
distinguished between the treatment of materials relating to “a potential terrorism130 or WMD
[Weapons of Mass Destruction131] threat to the United States homeland, its critical infrastructure, 
127 Id. Guideline 5(c).  The disclosure must be made “within 48 hours after the prosecutor is initially notified.”  Id.
128
 Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(3)(C)(iii).  Some protection may be afforded to “United States persons” under Exec. Or. 
12333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59941, 59950 (Dec. 4, 1981), which places limitations on the ability of intelligence agencies “to 
collect, retain or disseminate information concerning United States persons.”  Before disclosing grand jury materials 
identifying United States persons to federal intelligence officials, the prosecutor must label the materials as 
containing identifying information.  Memo. from John Ashcroft, U.S. Atty. Gen., to Heads of Dept. Components, 
Guidelines for Disclosure of Grand Jury and Electronic, Wire, and Oral Interception Inforn1ation Identifying 
United States Persons (Sept. 23, 2002).  Under certain circumstances, identifying references to United States 
persons may be deleted by the receiving agency.  Id.
129 See generally  supra notes 55 to 67 and accompanying text.
130
 “Terrorism Information” is defined as follows:
All information relating to the existence, organization, capabilities, plans, intentions, 
vulnerabilities, means of finance or material support, or activities of foreign or international
terrorist groups or individuals or threats posed by such groups or individuals to the United States, 
United States persons, or United States interests, or to those of other nations, or to 
communications between such groups or individuals, or information relating to groups or 
individuals reasonably believed to be assisting or associated with them.
Memo. supra n. 116 , at Guideline 5(a)(i).
131
 “Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Information” is defined as follows:
All information relating to conventional explosive weapons and non-conventional
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key resources (whether physical or electronic) or to United States persons or interests 
worldwide” and the treatment of other grand jury materials subject to disclosure under Rule the 
PATRIOT intelligence exception.  The former must be disclosed to the proper authorities 
“immediately,” while the latter must be disclosed “as expeditiously as possible.”132  When grand 
jury materials are released under the “as expeditiously as possible” standard, a period of forty-
eight hours exists during which the prosecutor may identify use restrictions or seek an exception 
to the requirement of disclosure from the Attorney General.133
c. The Use of the PATRIOT Intelligence Exception
Any question as to whether the PATRIOT intelligence exception would be used was 
quickly answered.  Between September 11, 2001 and July 26, 2002, approximately forty 
disclosures of federal grand jury materials containing foreign intelligence information were 
made.134  These disclosures involved thirty-nine separate grand juries.135
Interestingly, twenty-seven of the disclosures during this period involved the use of pre-
PATRIOT ACT procedure.136 The exact procedures used are unclear.  On September 20, 2002, 
the Justice Department informed the House Committee on the Judiciary that “grand jury material 
was shared under Rule 6(e)(3)(A)(ii),” the law-enforcement exception, which permits disclosure
without court approval to government personnel needed to help prosecutors enforce federal 
weapons capable of causing mass casualties and damage, including chemical, biological, 
radiological and nuclear agents and weapons and the means of delivery of such weapons.
Id. Guideline 5(a)(ii).
132 Id. Guideline 5(a).
133 Id. Guideline 5(a),(c).
134
 Ltr. From Daniel J. Bryant, Asst. Atty. Gen., to the Hon. F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Chairman, Comm. on the 
Jud., U.S. H.R., Questions Submitted by the House Judiciary Committeee to the Attorney General on USA Patriot 
Act Implementation 1 (July 26, 2002).
135
 Ltr. From Daniel J. Bryant, Asst. Atty. Gen., to the Hon. F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Chairman, Comm. on the 
Jud., U.S. H.R., Follow-up Questions Submitted by the House Judiciary Committeee to the Attorney General on USA 
Patriot Act Implementation 1 (Sept. 20, 2002).  Presumably, the bulk of these disclosures were made prior to the 
enactment of the USA PATRIOT Act.
136
 Ltr. From Daniel J. Bryant, Asst. Atty. Gen., to the Hon. F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Chairman, Comm. on the 
Jud., U.S. H.R., Grand Jury Notice Information 1 (Oct. 4, 2002).  
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criminal law.137 However, on October 4, 2002, the Justice Department reported that the districts 
involved “filed a motion and obtained an order from the court permitting such disclosure.”138
Since the law-enforcement exception permits disclosure without a court order, this 
discrepancy is puzzling.  It seems that prosecutors either sought court approval of their Rule 
6(e)(3)(A)(ii) disclosure as some sort of check on their decision making or sought disclosure 
pursuant to Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(i),139 which permits court-ordered disclosure.   Using either of these 
provisions for purposes of sharing information with the intelligence community is 
problematic.140
The law-enforcement exception141 might legitimately be used if the prosecutor’s purpose
were to obtain additional information for the federal criminal case under investigation.142  If, for 
example, a prosecutor needed the help of the CIA to obtain information about a foreign target to 
present to the grand jury, a CIA agent might fall with the category of government personnel to 
whom disclosure is permitted.  But if the prosecutor’s intent is not to enforce federal criminal 
law, but rather to inform the CIA of a threat to national security, the law-enforcement exception 
does not apply.  In addition, a CIA agent who received grand jury materials under this exception
could not disclose them to others.143 If the intent of the Justice Department in making the 
137
 Ltr., supra n. 135 , at 1.
138
 Ltr., supra n. 136 , at 1.
139
 The current version of this exception is found at Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(3)(E)(i).
140
 Indeed, at least one Senator who supported the amendment of Rule 6(e) did so because she believed that 
“[u]nder current law, law enforcement officials involved in a grand jury investigation cannot share 
information gathered in the grand jury with the intelligence community, even if that information would 
prevent a future terrorist act.”  147 Cong. Rec. at S10592 (statement of Senator Diane Feinstein).
141
 Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(3)(A)(ii).
142
 The Justice Department explained, “[i]n the context of the 9/11 investigation, grand jury information was shared 
with members of numerous JTTFs [Joint Terrorism Task Forces] around the country who participated in the 
PENTBOMB [9/11] investigation as well as representatives of the various agencies stationed at SIOC [Strategic 
Information and Operations Center].  The reason for this is that it is often necessary to disclose grand jury testimony 
to those involved in an investigation to further that investigation.”  Ltr., supra note 135, at 1.
143 See supra notes 56 to 60 and accompanying text.
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disclosures was to address a threat to national security, an absolute ban on further disclosure 
seems unworkable.
In contrast, court-ordered disclosure under Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(i), which permits court 
ordered disclosure “preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding,” would not 
impose an obligation of secrecy upon the recipient.144  Again, however, this exception does not 
appear to apply to situations in which the disclosure is intended to protect national security 
interests.  In United States v. Baggot,145 the United States Supreme Court strictly construed this 
language holding, “the Rule contemplates only uses related fairly directly to some identifiable 
litigation, pending or anticipated. . . .  If the primary purpose of disclosure is not to assist in 
preparation or conduct of a judicial proceeding, disclosure under (C)(i) is not permitted.”146
Thus, the fact that “litigation is factually likely to emerge” from an investigation of a threat to 
national security would not support disclosure under Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(i).147
The remaining disclosures were made under the PATRIOT intelligence exception.  
According to the Justice Department, all of the reporting districts148 invoking the new exception 
had filed the required notice of disclosure with the court supervising the grand jury through
which the information was obtained.149 No complaints have been received from the supervising 
courts as to the timeliness of the notices filed.150
144
 The obligation of secrecy imposed by Fed, R. Crim. P. 6(e)(2) applies only to grand jurors,  interpreters,  persons 
recording or transcribing the testimony, prosecutors, and persons to whom disclosure is made under the law-
enforcement exception.
145
 463 U.S. 476 (1983).
146 Id. at 480.
147 Id.
148
 At the time the Justice Department made it report, thirty-six of the thirty-eight districts involved in the disclosure 
of intelligence materials had reported.  Ltr., supra n. 136, at 1.
149 Id.  
150 Id.  According to the Justice Department, “[t]he courts supervising the grand juries are responsible for 
supervising the filing of notices and for disciplining any failure to file such notices.”  Ltr., supra n. 135 , at 1.  How 
the supervising court would ever learn of a failure to file is an open question.
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The Justice Department provided the House Judiciary Committee with a redacted 
exemplar151 that provides some valuable insights into how the exception is being used.152 The 
151 Id.
152
 The notices are provided in the form of pleadings filed under seal.  Id.  The text of the sample notice reads as 
follows:
 Pursuant to Section 203(a) of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 
272, 279 (2001), codified as Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(3)(C), the undersigned attorney for the 
government hereby provides notice to the Court regarding the disclosure to certain Federal 
departments, agencies, and entities of criminal investigative information that may include “matters 
occurring before” the above-captioned grand jury regarding xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
and related criminal activity, as follows:
1. Grand juries empaneled in this district have issued subpoenas and engaged in other 
investigative activities in conjunction with xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx  
and related criminal activity.  To the extent that information relating to the grand juries’s [sic] 
activities constitutes “matters occurring before the grand jury” within the meaning of Rule 6(e)(2) 
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, it may not be disclosed “except as provided for” under 
the Rules.  Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(2).
2.  Section 203(a) of the USA PATRIOT Act , which was signed into law on October 26, 
2001, amends Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(i) to authorize disclosure of matters occurring before the grand jury:
(V) when the matters involve foreign intelligence or counterintelligence (as 
defined in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a)) [sic], 
or foreign intelligence information (as defined in clause (iv) of this 
subparagraph), to any Federal law enforcement, intelligence, protective, 
immigration, national defense, or national security official in order to assist the 
official receiving that information in the performance of his official duties. 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(3)(C)(i)(V).
3.  The investigation into the September 11 attacks and related criminal activity involves such 
“foreign intelligence or counterintelligence and foreign intelligence information.  Moreover, the 
sharing of information developed during the investigation assists a variety of “Federal law 
enforcement, intelligence, protective, immigration, national defense, [and national] security 
officials in the performance of their official duties.  Consequently, criminal investigative 
information, which may include matters occurring before grand juries, has been disclosed and will 
continue to be disclosed to such officials.  Of course, an official who receives such information 
“may use it only as necessary in the conduct of that person’s official duties subject to any 
limitations on the unauthorized disclosure of such information.”  Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(3)(C)(iii).
4.  The amended rule requires that, “[w]ithin a reasonable time after such disclosure an 
attorney for the government shall file under seal a notice with the court stating the fact that such 
information was disclosed and the departments, agencies, or entities to which disclosure was 
made.”  Id.  Unlike the disclosure required in other contexts, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(3)(B), in 
matters involving these sort of intelligence interests, which may (as in this case) involve literally 
thousands of Federal law enforcement and other officials, the rule does not require notice to name 
each individual official to whom grand jury information has been disclosed, only their 
“departments, agencies, or entities.”
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most striking feature of the exemplar is the sheer breadth of the disclosure.  The Court is 
informed that the intelligence interests in question “involve literally thousands of Federal law 
enforcement and other officials.”153  The recipients include everyone from the CIA to the Social 
Security Administration Inspector General.154  Such widespread dissemination of grand jury 
materials is unprecedented.  Under the new exception, prosecutors are not even constrained by 
the need to list the individuals receiving the information.155 Clearly, the passage of the USA 
PATRIOT Act ushered in a new era in the use of federal grand jury materials.
            2.   The Homeland Security Amendments
The new era continued with the passage of yet more far-reaching legislation in the form 
of the Homeland Security Act of 2002.156 While much of the public’s attention to this Act was 
5.  Accordingly, the undersigned attorney for the government hereby notifies the Court that 
information relating to the above-captioned grand jury investigations, which may include “matters 
occurring before the grand jury,” has been and will be disclosed to the following Federal 
departments, agencies, and entities pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(C)(i)(V):
(a) Department of Justice (including Federal Bureau of Investigation).
(b) Department of Treasury.
(c) Department of Defense.
(d) Department of State.
(e) Department of Transportation.
(f) Department of Energy.
(g) Postal Inspection Service.
(h) Central Intelligence Agency.
(i) National Security Agency.
(j) National Security Council.
(k) Naval Criminal Investigative Service
(l) Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
(m) Federal Aviation Administration.
(n) Social Security Administration Inspector General.
6. Pursuant to Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(iii), this notice is filed UNDER SEAL.
Id. at Attachment to Follow-up Question 4 (footnotes omitted). 
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 The Justice Department termed the requirement under Rule 6(e)(3)(A)(ii) that prosecutors provide a list of every 
individual to whom information is disclosed “onerous and a diversion of resources from investigative activity.”  Ltr., 
supra n. 135 , at 1.  
156
 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 895, 116 Stat. 2135, 2256-57 (2002).
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directed towards provisions creating a new cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security, the 
Act also included provisions that purported to amend  Rule 6(e) yet again.157
The concern that the improvements in information sharing wrought by the enactment of 
the USA PATRIOT Act did not go far enough prompted this amendment.158  Specifically, 
legislators expressed their concern that the USA PATRIOT Act failed to bring state and local 
officials into the information loop.159 Such officials were believed to be at the vanguard of the 
war on terrorism.160 It was the sense of Congress “that Federal, State, and local entities should 
share homeland security information to the maximum extent possible.”161 Legislators also 
voiced their concerns that the USA PATRIOT Act failed to address the problem of domestic 
terrorism.162
a. The Purported Amendment of Rule 6(e)
In some respects, the changes wrought to Rule 6(e) by the USA PATRIOT Act pale in 
comparison to those Congress sought to create via the Homeland Security Act. The Homeland 
Security Act of 2002 contained additional amendments to Rule 6 that further erode the doctrine 
of grand jury secrecy.163
The most significant amendment creates a new exception to the obligation of grand jury 
secrecy which allows disclosure without judicial approval:
157 Id.  The Homeland Security Act of 2002 incorporated the provisions of an earlier bill, H.R. 4598, the “Homeland 
Security Information Sharing Act.”
158 E.g., 148 Cong. Rec. H3939 (June 26, 2002) (statement of Rep. F. James Sensenbrenner).
159 E.g., id.
160 Id.  Congress specifically found that “[s]ome homeland security information is needed by State and local 
personnel to prevent and prepare for terrorist attack” and that “State and local personnel have capabilities and 
opportunities to gather information on suspicious activities and terrorist threats not possessed by Federal agencies.”  
Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 891(b)(4),(8), 116 Stat. 2135, 2252 (2002).
161 Id. § 891(c). 
162
 148 Cong. Rec. at H3939.  See also H.R. Rpt. 107-534 § 6 (June 25, 2002) (“Domestic threat information is 
included because it is not always clear whether threats to public safety result from international or domestic 
terrorism threats. The anthrax attacks are one example of where the origin of that attacks is not clear.”). 
163
 116 Stat. at 2256-57.
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when matters involve a threat of actual or potential attack or other grave hostile 
acts of a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power, domestic or international 
sabotage, domestic or international terrorism, or clandestine intelligence gathering 
activities by an intelligence service or network of a foreign power or by an agent 
of a foreign power, within the United States or elsewhere, to any appropriate 
federal, state, local, or foreign government official for the purpose of preventing 
or responding to such a threat.164
Congress has again created an exception that fundamentally differs from the traditional 
exceptions165 by permitting prosecutors to disclose grand jury materials to persons who are not 
intimately involved in the prosecution of federal crimes.166 In contrast to those traditional
exceptions controlling disclosure to persons unrelated to the grand jury function,167 the new
exception (hereafter referred to as the “Homeland Security exception”) requires no judicial 
intervention and no showing of particularized need.  
Several aspects of this new exception are disquieting.  First, the Act ill defines the types 
of information subject to disclosure.  In drafting the amendments contained within the USA 
PATRIOT Act, Congress defined the categories of information that may be disclosed—it 
provided specific definitions for “foreign intelligence,” etc.168 These definitions may be broad, 
164 116 Stat. at 2256.  
The Act also sought to amend the language of existing Rule 6(e)(3)(A)(ii) to include personnel of a foreign 
government among those to whom an attorney for the government may disclose grand jury materials when needed to 
assist in enforcing federal criminal law.  Id. A prosecutor disclosing grand jury materials to a foreign official under 
this provision would be required to provide the official’s name to the court that impaneled the grand jury.  Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 6(e)(3)(B).   Foreign officials receiving grand jury materials pursuant to this exception would have an 
obligation of secrecy under existing Rule 6(e)(2).  
In addition, the Act sought to amend the language of existing Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(i)(I) to expressly allow a 
court to order disclosure “upon request by an attorney by the government when sought by a foreign court or 
prosecutor for use in an official criminal investigation.”  116 Stat. at 2256.  In essence, this amendment clarified that 
at least some foreign proceedings qualify as “judicial proceedings” under Rule 6.  Along the same lines, the Act 
sought to amend existing Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(i)(IV) to expressly permit a court to order disclosure of  a violation of 
foreign criminal law to a foreign official for the purpose of enforcing that law.  116 Stat. at 2256. This amendment 
was believed necessary because “even when the Government [made] an appropriate showing to the court (i.e., a 
showing similar to that required for disclosure of grand jury material in a domestic proceeding), the rule as . . . 
written [did] not expressly authorize courts to order disclosure. As a consequence, the U.S. prosecutor sometimes 
[was forced to] re-subpoena the same information from the original sources.” H.R. Rpt. 107-534 at § 6.
165 See supra notes 55 to 67 and accompanying text.
166 Id. 
167 See supra notes 68 to 89 and accompanying text.
168 See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
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but they do place some limitation on disclosure.  The Homeland Security Act provides no such 
definitions.  For example, a term like “domestic terrorism” could be susceptible to varying 
interpretations.  If a prosecutor learns via grand jury testimony of a planned anti-war sit-in may 
the prosecutor inform intelligence officials of the identity of its planners?169 The question of 
where “ordinary” crime ends and “domestic terrorism” begins is left unanswered.170
Second, the Act provides no limitation on the category of government official to whom 
information may be disclosed.  It may be given to any “appropriate” official.171 Congressional 
testimony172 and debate173 centered on the need to involve state and local officials in the war on 
terrorism, but the new exception also permits disclosure to foreign officials.  Nothing in the 
Congressional record explains this decision.  Indeed, there is no discussion of the unique risks 
disclosure to non citizens and residents might pose to the grand jury process.   
Once more, the language of the Homeland Security exception contrasts sharply with that 
of the PATRIOT intelligence exception, which provides a list of approved categories.174  Given 
that the Homeland Security exception is intended to prevent acts such as terrorism and sabotage, 
and that the circumstances surrounding such acts would be highly variable, the desire to allow 
some leeway as to the selection of the appropriate official is understandable.  Nonetheless, the 
utter lack of boundaries creates unprecedented access to grand jury materials.
169
 Leaving decisions as to when disclosure is warranted in the hands of individual prosecutors is bound to lead to 
inconsistencies in interpretation.
170
 Under federal criminal law, “domestic terrorism” is defined as 
activities that-- (A) involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws 
of the United States or of any State; (B) appear to be intended--(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian 
population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to 
affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and (C)
occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.
18 U.S.C.  § 2331(5) (2000 & Supp I 2002).
171
 116 Stat. at 2256.
172 E.g., Subcomm. on Crime H.R. Jud. Comm., H.R.4598, The Homeland Security Information Sharing Act,
Cong. Test., 2002 WL 20317655 (June 4, 2002) (statement of Rep. Saxby Chambliss).
173 E.g., 148 Cong. Rec. at H3941-H3942 (statement of Rep. Anthony Weiner).
174
 See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
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Legislators did express some concern over the disclosure of grand jury information.175
However, they believed that the Act contained adequate safeguards to protect grand jury 
secrecy.176 As with persons receiving grand jury materials under the PATRIOT intelligence 
exception, the obligation of secrecy imposed by Rule 6(e)(2) does not apply to persons obtaining 
information under the Homeland Security exception.  Still, some limitations on use exist.  
Officials receiving grand jury materials pursuant to this exception may use it only as needed in 
the conduct of their duties.177 They must use it for the purpose specified by the exception, “to 
prevent or respond to a threat.”178 Joint guidelines to be promulgated by the Attorney General 
and the Director of the CIA may impose additional limitations on use by state, local, and foreign
officials.179 Such officials may be punished for contempt of court for any violation of that 
obligation.180
The effectiveness of these safeguards remains to be seen.  As with the PATRIOT 
intelligence exception,181 there is no requirement that prosecutors identify recipients of grand 
jury materials to the court overseeing the grand jury.  Prosecutors need only file a notice with the 
court indicating that the information was disclosed and identifying the entity receiving the 
materials.182 Further, with the exception of the contempt sanction created for violations of the 
joint guidelines discussed above,183 Congress again failed to expressly grant the courts the power 
175 E.g., 148 Cong. Rec. at H3942 (statement of Rep. Anthony Weiner) (“I share the concerns that some raised in 
committee that we do not want this information to chip away at the confidentiality of the grand jury.”)
176 Id. at H3939 (statement of Rep. F. James Sensenbrenner) (noting, “[t]he information may only be disclosed for 
the specified purpose of preventing and responding to a threat. Additionally, recipients may only use the disclosed 
information in the conduct of their official duties as is necessary, and they are subject to the restrictions for 
unauthorized disclosures, including contempt of court.”).
177
 116 Stat. at 2256.  
178 H.R. Rpt. 107-534 at § 6.
179 Id.  Persons receiving information under this exception “shall use that information only consistent with such 
guidelines as the Attorney General and Director of Central Intelligence shall jointly issue.”  Id. at 2257.
180 Id. at 2256.
181 See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
182
 116 Stat. at 2256.
183 See supra notes 179 to 180 and accompanying text.
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to impose the sanction of contempt.184  And how a court might be expected to impose contempt 
sanctions without knowing the identity of the person or persons to whom disclosure was made is 
a mystery.
b. The Current Status of Rule 6(e)
The Homeland Security Act amendments were supposed to become effective sixty days 
after the date of enactment.185  However, in drafting the amendments, Congress failed to 
consider the amendment and restructuring of Rule 6(e) that came into effect on December 1, 
2002.186  This restructuring made the amendments incapable of execution.187  President George 
184
 Again, the courts may possess the inherent power to impose this sanction.  .  See supra notes 39, 43, 111 and 
accompanying text.
185
 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 4, 116 Stat. 2142 (2002).  
186
 As of the writing of this article, Fed. R. Crim P. 6(e)(2),(3) reads as follows:  
(2) Secrecy.
(A) No obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with Rule 
6(e)(2)(B).
(B) Unless these rules provide otherwise, the following persons must not disclose a matter 
occurring before the grand jury:
(i) a grand juror;
(ii) an interpreter;
(iii) a court reporter;
(iv) an operator of a recording device;
(v) a person who transcribes recorded testimony;
(vi) an attorney for the government; or
(vii) a person to whom disclosure is made under Rule 6(e)(3)(A)(ii) or (iii).
(3) Exceptions.
(A) Disclosure of a grand-jury matter--other than the grand jury's deliberations or any grand 
juror's vote--may be made to:
(i) an attorney for the government for use in performing that attorney's duty;
(ii) any government personnel--including those of a state or state subdivision or of an 
Indian tribe--that an attorney for the government considers necessary to assist in performing 
that attorney's duty to enforce federal criminal law; or
(iii) a person authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 3322.
(B) A person to whom information is disclosed under Rule 6(e)(3)(A)(ii) may use that 
information only to assist an attorney for the government in performing that attorney's duty to 
enforce federal criminal law. An attorney for the government must promptly provide the court 
that impaneled the grand jury with the names of all persons to whom a disclosure has been 
made, and must certify that the attorney has advised those persons of their obligation of secrecy 
under this rule.
(C) An attorney for the government may disclose any grand-jury matter to another federal 
grand jury.
(D) An attorney for the government may disclose any grand-jury matter involving foreign 
intelligence, counterintelligence (as defined in 50 U.S.C. § 401a), or foreign intelligence 
information (as defined in Rule 6(e)(3)(D)(iii)) to any federal law enforcement, intelligence, 
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protective, immigration, national defense, or national security official to assist the official 
receiving the information in the performance of that official's duties.
(i) Any federal official who receives information under Rule 6(e)(3)(D) may use the 
information only as necessary in the conduct of that person's official duties subject to any 
limitations on the unauthorized disclosure of such information.
(ii) Within a reasonable time after disclosure is made under Rule 6(e)(3)(D), an attorney 
for the government must file, under seal, a notice with the court in the district where the grand 
jury convened stating that such information was disclosed and the departments, agencies, or 
entities to which the disclosure was made.
(iii) As used in Rule 6(e)(3)(D), the term "foreign intelligence information" means:
(a) information, whether or not it concerns a United States person, that relates to the 
ability of the United States to protect against--
• actual or potential attack or other grave hostile acts of a foreign power or its 
agent;
• sabotage or international terrorism by a foreign power or its agent; or
• clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service or network of a 
foreign power or by its agent; or
(b) information, whether or not it concerns a United States person, with respect to a 
foreign power or foreign territory that relates to--
• the national defense or the security of the United States; or
• the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States.
(E) The court may authorize disclosure--at a time, in a manner, and subject to any other 
conditions that it directs--of a grand-jury matter:
(i) preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding;
(ii) at the request of a defendant who shows that a ground may exist to dismiss the 
indictment because of a matter that occurred before the grand jury;
(iii) at the request of the government if it shows that the matter may disclose a violation 
of state or Indian tribal criminal law, as long as the disclosure is to an appropriate state, state-
subdivision, or Indian tribal official for the purpose of enforcing that law; or
(iv) at the request of the government if it shows that the matter may disclose a violation 
of military criminal law under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, as long as the disclosure 
is to an appropriate military official for the purpose of enforcing that law.
(F) A petition to disclose a grand-jury matter under Rule 6(e)(3)(E)(i) must be filed in the 
district where the grand jury convened. Unless the hearing is ex parte--as it may be when the 
government is the petitioner--the petitioner must serve the petition on, and the court must afford a 
reasonable opportunity to appear and be heard to:
(i) an attorney for the government;
(ii) the parties to the judicial proceeding; and
(iii) any other person whom the court may designate.
(G) If the petition to disclose arises out of a judicial proceeding in another district, the petitioned
court must transfer the petition to the other court unless the petitioned court can reasonably 
determine whether disclosure is proper. If the petitioned court decides to transfer, it must send to 
the transferee court the material sought to be disclosed, if feasible, and a written evaluation of the 
need for continued grand-jury secrecy. The transferee court must afford those persons identified in 
Rule 6(e)(3)(F) a reasonable opportunity to appear and be heard.
Along with restyling Rule 6(e), the 2002 amendments contained some substantive changes that are 
worthy of note.  Under Rule 6(e)(3)(A)(iii), a prosecutor may disclose grand jury materials to an 
attorney for the government for purposes of enforcing civil forfeiture laws and civil banking laws 
under 18 U.S.C. § 3322.  This provision was added to ensure that the amendments to Rule 6 did not 
supercede 18 U.S.C. § 3322.   Fed. R. Crim. P. 6 GAP Rpt. 2002 amends.  Underlying section 3322 is 
the idea “because all civil forfeiture actions are now recognized as law enforcement functions, grand 
jury information should be available to government attorneys for their use in all civil forfeiture cases.”  
See generally H.R. Rpt. 105-358(I) § 8 (Oct. 30, 1997).  Also, Rule 6(e)(3)(A)(ii) now expressly 
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W. Bush has indicated that he plans to seek technical amendments from Congress that will 
permit the provisions to go into effect.188
The simple fact that Congress amended Rule 6(e) without taking into account its planned 
restructuring underscores the haste with which it reached its decision to alter centuries-old 
policies.   Now is an opportune moment for Congress to reflect on the changes it has wrought.  
Before considering the technical amendments sought by the President, it would be prudent for 
Congress to revisit the post 9/11 amendments, considering both their constitutionality and their 
impact upon the functioning of the grand jury.
II. Grand Jury Secrecy and the Fifth Amendment
The Grand Jury Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees, 
“No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a 
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury.”  The parameters of this right have yet to be fully 
defined.  In particular, the United States Supreme Court has never directly ruled on whether the 
right to secrecy of grand jury proceedings is implicit in a person’s right to indictment by a grand 
jury. The examination of whether Congress should rethink the recent amendments to Rule 6(e) 
begins with an analysis of whether grand jury secrecy has constitutional underpinnings.  Given 
the magnitude of change they create, the recent amendments to Rule 6(e) should compel
Congress (if not the courts) to ponder this thorny issue.
A. Costello v. United States:  The Final Word on Grand Jury Rights?
In Costello v. United States,189 the Supreme Court provided its clearest statement of the rights 
guaranteed by the Grand Jury Clause.  The defendant in that case, Frank Costello, was indicted 
recognizes that to enforce federal criminal law a prosecutor may need to disclose information to 
government personnel of an Indian tribe.
187
 The renumbering of the sections within Rule 6(e) made it impossible to make the requested insertions.
188
 George W. Bush, Statement on the Signing of H.R. 5005, the Homeland Security Act of 2002, 2002 WL 
31650677 at 4 (Nov. 25, 2002).
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for and ultimately convicted of willfully attempting to avoid federal income taxes.190  Both 
during and after trial, the defendant moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that it was 
based solely upon hearsay evidence and thus violated the Grand Jury Clause.191  The United 
States District Court for the Southern District of New York denied his motion and the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.192  In upholding the lower courts’ 
rulings, the Supreme Court concluded, “An indictment returned by a legally constituted and 
unbiased grand jury . . . if valid on its face, is enough to call for trial of the charge on the merits.  
The Fifth Amendment requires nothing more.”193
Standing alone, Costello could be read to stand for the proposition that the right to indictment 
by a grand jury does not encompass the right to secrecy of grand jury proceedings.  If a grand 
jury is legally constituted and unbiased and if it issues an indictment, the constitutional 
requirements are satisfied.  Indeed, a few lower courts have specifically found that the right to 
secrecy “was never intended as a safeguard for the interests of the accused,”194 and thus, cannot 
be said to be incorporated into the Fifth Amendment rights of the accused.
B.  Midland Asphalt Corporation v. United States:  Acknowledging the Role of Grand 
Jury Secrecy
Treating Costello as the final word on the rights encompassed in the Grand Jury Clause 
stretches the Court’s holding too far.  Costello addressed the limited question of what the Grand 
189
 350 U.S. 359.
190 Id. at 359-60.
191 Id. at 361.
192 Id.
193 Id. at 363.
194 E.g., in re Grand Jury Proceedings, 4 F. Supp. at 284-85.  See also U.S. v. Amazon Indus. Chemical Corp., 55 
F.2d 254, 261 (D.C. Md. 1931) (concluding, “none of the reasons for [grand jury secrecy] are founded upon an 
inherent right in the individual who is being investigated to the same constitutional safeguards that are 
unquestionably his when he is brought to trial for a given crime”).
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Jury Clause requires before a person may be subjected to trial.195  It did not address whether the 
Grand Jury Clause contains other requirements that must be satisfied to avoid dismissal of an 
indictment.  In Midland Asphalt Corporation v. United States,196 the Supreme Court spoke to this 
critical distinction.197  The defendants, Midland Asphalt Corporation and Albert C. Litterer, 
moved to dismiss the indictment against them on the grounds that the Government had violated 
Rule 6(e) by disclosing matters occurring before the grand jury.198  The United States District 
Court for the Southern District of New York denied the motion, and on appeal, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit dismissed defendants’ appeal on the grounds that “the 
indictment was not a ‘final decision’ under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.”199  In affirming the Second 
Circuit’s decision, the Supreme Court held, “There is a ‘crucial distinction between a right not to 
be tried and a right whose remedy requires the dismissal of charges.’”200
Consistent with the Costello decision, the Court noted that “a right not to be tried” exists 
“when there is no grand jury indictment.”201  The Court went on to hold, “Only a defect so 
fundamental that it causes the grand jury no longer to be a grand jury, or the indictment no 
longer to be an indictment gives rise to the constitutional right not to be tried.202  The “isolated 
breach of the traditional secrecy requirements” by the Government was deemed insufficient to 
satisfy either of these requirements.203 Nonetheless, the Midland Asphalt Court’s ruling left open 
195 Costello, 350 U.S. at 363.
196
 489 U.S. 794 (1989).
197 Id. at 800-02.
198 Id. at 796.
199 Id.
200 Id. at 801 (quoting U.S. v. Hollywood Motor Car Co., 458 U.S. 263, 269, 102 S.Ct. 3081, 3085, 73 L.Ed.2d 754 
(1982)). 




the possibility that violations of the secrecy requirements incorporated into Rule 6(e) might 
provide the basis for a reversal of a conviction on appeal.204
Perhaps, most importantly, the Court clarified the protections afforded by the Grand Jury 
Clause, acknowledging, “Undoubtedly the common-law protections traditionally associated with 
the grand jury attach to the grand jury required by [the Grand Jury Clause]—including the 
requisite secrecy of grand jury proceedings.”205  In essence, the Court seemed to indicate that 
defendants have a Fifth Amendment right to be indicted by a grand jury that functions under the 
traditional, common-law rules of secrecy.206  Given that the Supreme Court has “consistently . . . 
recognized that the proper functioning of our grand jury system depends upon the secrecy of 
grand jury proceedings,”207 such a rule would make sense.
C. Exploring the Interests Protected by Grand Jury Secrecy
Understanding the constitutional underpinnings of the right to secrecy is impossible 
without understanding the function of the grand jury.  The grand jury’s “establishment in the 
Constitution 'as the sole method for preferring charges in serious criminal cases' indeed 'shows 
the high place it (holds) as an instrument of justice.'”208   In recent years, the Supreme Court has 
stressed that the grand jury serves “the ‘dual function of determining if there is probable cause to 
believe that a crime has been committed and of protecting citizens against unfounded criminal 
204 See id. at 799-800.  The Court also left open the possibility that in an extreme circumstance, a violation of grand 
jury secrecy could give rise to the right not to be tried.  See id. at 802.  Although the court found that an “isolated 
breach of the traditional secrecy requirements” did not give rise to such a right, id., it did not address whether a 




 Douglas Oil Co. of California v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 218 (1979).  Accord  Butterworth v. 
Smith, 494 U.S. 624, 630 (1990).   
208
 Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 360 U.S. at 399-400 (quoting Costello v. U.S., 1956, 350 U.S. 359, 362, 76 S.Ct. 406, 
408, 100 L.Ed. 397).  See generally Hurtado v. People of State of California, 110 U.S. 516, 554-55 (1884) (Harlan, 
J., dissenting) (“In the secrecy of the investigations by grand juries, the weak and helpless--proscribed, perhaps, 
because of their race, or pursued by an unreasoning public clamor--have found, and will continue to find, security 
against official oppression, the cruelty of mobs, the machinations of falsehood, and the malevolence of private 
persons who would use the machinery of the law to bring ruin upon their personal enemies.”).
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prosecutions.’"209  “The . . .  concern for the grand jury’s dual function underlies the ‘long-
established policy that maintains the secrecy of the grand jury proceedings in the federal 
courts.’”210
The Supreme Court has recognized four distinct interests protected by the right to secrecy 
in grand jury proceedings.211 One, “if preindictment proceedings were made public, many 
prospective witnesses would be hesitant to come forward voluntarily, knowing that those against 
whom they testify would be aware of that testimony.”212  Two, “witnesses who appeared before 
the grand jury would be less likely to testify fully and frankly, as they would be open to 
retribution as well as to inducements.”213  Three, the risk would exist “that those about to be 
indicted would flee, or would try to influence individual grand jurors to vote against 
indictment.”214  Four, “by preserving the secrecy of the proceedings, we assure that persons who 
are accused but exonerated by the grand jury will not be held up to public ridicule.”215
Clearly, not all of these interests implicate the constitutional rights of a defendant.216  But 
interests one and two go to the very heart of the grand jury function of shielding the innocent 
from prosecution.  The system cannot work without witnesses who “feel free to speak the truth 
without reserve.”217   The “cloak of silence” covering grand jury proceedings was born in part of 
209
 Sells Eng’g, Inc., 463 U.S. at 423 (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 686-687, 92 S.Ct. 2646, 2659, 33 
L.Ed.2d 626 (1972) (footnote omitted)) (emphasis added). See supra notes 15 to 20 and accompanying text.
210 Id. at 424 (quoting Proctor & Gamble, 356 U.S. 677, 681, 78 S.Ct. 983, 986, 2 L.Ed. 1077 (1958) (footnote 
omitted).  “The grand jury is an English institution, brought to this country by the early colonists and incorporated in 
the Constitution by the Founders.  There is every reason to believe that our constitutional grand jury was intended to 
operate substantially like its English progenitor.”  Costello, 350 U.S. at 362.  The English grand jury traditionally 
“act[ed] in secret.”  Id.
211 E.g., Sells Engineering, Inc., 463 U.S. at 424; Douglas Oil Co., 441 U.S. at 218. 





 Interest three, for example, relates to the public’s interest in determining whether probable cause exists to believe 
a crime has been committed.
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 Goodman, 108 F.2d at 519.
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“the desire to create a sanctuary, inviolate to any intrusion except on proof of some special and 
overriding need, where a witness may testify, free and unfettered by fear of retaliation.”218
It is not unreasonable to ask why special protection of grand jury witnesses is warranted. 
Today’s grand jury witness may be tomorrow’s trial witness and, therefore, subject to public 
questioning.   But not every grand jury proceeding results in an indictment, not every indictment 
results in a trial,219 and not every trial requires testimony from every grand jury witness. It is far 
from certain that any given grand jury witness will ever be asked to testify at trial.  
Perhaps more important, the difference in circumstances between an appearance at trial 
and an appearance before the grand jury may also justify greater protection.220  Grand jury 
witnesses appear unprotected by counsel221 and can be subjected to intense questioning or even 
browbeating by prosecutors.222 Prosecutors are allowed to “go fishing” and to seek evidence, 
such as hearsay, that would not be admissible at trial.223
“Grand jury secrecy . . . ‘is as important for the protection of the innocent as for the 
pursuit of the guilty.’”224 If potential, but unknown, witnesses fear that their grand jury 
testimony will be not be protected, they may remain in the shadows, and if known witnesses fear 
for their safety or that of friends of family, they may be provide incomplete or inaccurate 
218
 Texas v. U.S. Steel Corp., 546 F.2d 626, 629 (5th Cir. 1977).
219
 For example, in fiscal year 1999 only six percent of all federal criminal defendants were disposed of by trial.  
Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, United States Attorneys Annual Statistical Report 14 
(2000). 
220 See generally Daniel C. Richman, Grand Jury Secrecy:  Plugging the Leaks in an Empty Bucket, 36 Am. Crim. 
L. Rev. 339, 353-54 (1999).
221
 A grand jury witness does not have the right to have counsel present during questioning.  Petition of Groban, 352 
U.S. 330, 333 (1957).  In essence, the scope of the questioning is completely in the hands of the prosecutor. 
222
 Illinois v. F.E. Moran, Inc., 740 F.2d 533, 540 (7th Cir. 1984).
223
 Costello, 350 U.S. at 361-64.  
224
 Sells Engineering, Inc., 463 U.S. at 424.  Contra in re Grand Jury Proc., 4 F. Supp. at 284-85 (“The rule of 
secrecy . . . was designed for the protection of the witnesses who appear and for the purpose of allowing a wider and 
freer scope of the grand jury itself, and was never intended as a safeguard for the interests of the accused or any third 
person.”).
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testimony.225  When either of these events takes place, when less than the whole story is told, an 
innocent person may stand accused.226  The Grand Jury Clause requires a grand jury that is a real 
grand jury with all of its protections, not a grand jury in name only.
Repeated breaches of grand jury secrecy result in systemic injury to the grand jury 
process. They are like termites undermining the structure of a building.  It is the cumulative 
effect of disclosures that ultimately denies grand jury targets their Fifth Amendment right to a 
meaningful review by the grand jury.  That is arguably why the courts and rulemakers have been 
so miserly in recognizing exceptions to the rule of grand secrecy and in granting disclosure 
pursuant to those exceptions.  If the exceptions are permitted to swallow the rule, the grand jury 
process suffers.  
To illustrate, if the testimony of a grand jury witness in Cas e A is disclosed, no injury 
may result to the target in Case A.  The disclosure may have no impact whatsoever on the 
proceedings involving this particular target.  But that does not mean that the disclosure is not 
harmful.  The harm comes over time.  As more and more disclosures occur and as the 
ramifications of those disclosures gradually become public knowledge, a chilling effect227 sets in.  
225 E.g., Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 360 U.S. at 400 (noting, “testimony would be parsimonious if each witness 
knew that his testimony would soon be in the hands of the accused”); Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 
441 U.S. 211, 219 (1979) (recognizing “if preindictment proceedings were made public, many prospective witnesses 
would be hesitant to come forward voluntarily, knowing that those against whom they testify would be aware of that 
testimony” and “witnesses who appeared before the grand jury would be less likely to testify fully and frankly, as 
they would be open to retribution as well as inducments”).
226In the words of Justice Harlan,
In the secrecy of the investigations by grand juries, the weak and helpless--proscribed, perhaps, 
because of their race, or pursued by an unreasoning public clamor--have found, and will continue 
to find, security against official oppression, the cruelty of mobs, the machinations of falsehood, 
and the malevolence of private persons who would use the machinery of the law to bring ruin 
upon their personal enemies. 'The grand juries perform,' says STORY, 'most important public 
functions, and are a great security to the citizens against vindictive prosecutions, either by the 
government or by political partisans, or by private enemies.' 
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 554-555, 4 S. Ct. 292, 301 (1884) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
227
 I am not suggesting that the right of grand jury secrecy is based in any way upon the First Amendment.  What I 
am suggesting is that there are times when the mere threat of a governmental action can deter a person from 
speaking.  For example, United States Supreme Court has long recognized that the threat of the loss of a financial 
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Fearing retribution of some sort, a witness in Case X fails to step forward with information about 
the identity of the true perpetrator of the crime and another witness tells the grand jury less than 
the whole story or flat out lies.  The target in Case X becomes the victim of a grand jury system 
weakened by breaches of secrecy.
D.  Understanding the Dearth of Supreme Court Authority
The dearth of Supreme Court authority directly addressing the existence of a 
constitutional right of grand jury secrecy can be explained by the types of cases it has heard.
Some cases have simply not implicated secrecy interests relating to the constitutional rights of 
defendants.  For instance, Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States228 and Dennis v. United 
States229 involved motions in which the accused sought to obtain grand jury materials.  Since any 
constitutional right to secrecy arises only from the Grand Jury Clause and since the Grand Jury 
Clause creates rights belonging to the accused, not the Government, these rights would not 
ordinarily come into play in a case in which the accused sought disclosure.230 In other cases, the 
Court was able to reach a finding that disclosure was not permitted under Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 6(e),231 and thus, no need existed to examine any constitutional 
requirements.   
benefit, such as a job or a contract, “in retaliation for speech may chill speech on matters of public concern . . . .”  
E.g., Board of County Commissioners v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 674 (1996).  In the case of actual and potential 
grand jury witnesses, the threat that their testimony may be disclosed to those who would cause them harm may 
deter witnesses from speaking freely and truthfully.
228
 360 U.S. at 396.
229
 384 U.S. 855, 868 (1966).
230
 Of course, even in the absence of any constitutional protection, the Court may consider the “long-established 
policy of secrecy” in interpreting Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.  See, e.g., Pittsburgh Plate 
Glass Co., 360 U.S. at 398-401. 
231
 Baggot, 463 U.S. at 477-80 (holding disclosure of grand jury materials to the IRS to allow it to determine tax 
liability was not permitted under Rule 6(e));  Illlinois v. Abbott & Associates, 460 U.S. 557, 566-568 (1983) 
(finding disclosure of grand jury materials to state attorney general without court approval and without a showing of 
particularized need would not comport with the requirements of Rule 6(e)); U.S. v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 
677, 681-82 (1958) (concluding defendants in a civil antitrust action were not entitled to discovery of a grand jury 
transcript in the possession of the Government).
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In the last fifty years, only one Supreme Court decision, United States v. John Doe, Inc. 
I,232 has ordered disclosure pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e).  That case 
involved a request by attorneys in the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice to disclose 
grand jury materials to the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York and to 
five named attorneys within the Civil Division.233  The purpose of this disclosure was to allow 
attorneys from the Antitrust Division to consult with their counterparts234 before filing a civil 
action.235
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York concluded that 
the Department of Justice had satisfied the requirements of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
6(e)(3)(C)(i) by showing “a particularized need for disclosure,” but the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, deeming the disclosure “unnecessary.”236  After 
reviewing the record, the Supreme Court concluded that the District Court correctly applied the 
“particularized need” standard and did not abuse its discretion in allowing disclosure.237
The John Doe, Inc. I case provided the Court with  perhaps its best opportunity to 
examine the relationship between the right of grand jury secrecy and the right to a grand jury 
created by the Grand Jury Clause.  Still, even this case did not require the Court to do so.  It 
involved the application of Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(i),238 which requires a court order to obtain 
discovery239 and which requires “’a strong showing of particularized need’ before disclosure is 
232
 U.S. v. John Doe, Inc. I, 481 U.S. 102 (1987).  
233 Id. at 104-05.
234
 The case involved a potential claim under the False Claims Act, and such claims were more typically handled by 
the Civil Division.  Id. at 105.  
235 Id.
236 Id. at 111.
237 Id. at 116-17.
238
 The current version of this exception is found at Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(3)(E)(i).
239
 John Doe, Inc. I, 481 U.S. at 111.
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permitted.”240  Even if the Court were to have expressly recognized the constitutional 
underpinnings of the right to secrecy, the test it applied would have likely been the same.241
Indeed, in applying the test, the Court specifically examined whether the disclosure would 
seriously threaten the recognized secrecy interests.242
In sum, the United States Supreme Court has never directly addressed the constitutional 
underpinnings of the doctrine of grand jury secrecy because the need to do so has never arisen.  
The common law and the pre-9/11 version of Rule 6(e) provided safeguards to the doctrine at 
least equal to those required by the Fifth Amendment.  If faced with the issue of whether a 
material breach of the traditional protection afforded grand jury secrecy violates the Constitution, 
the Supreme Court should conclude that it does do so.   To rule otherwise would strip the right to 
indictment by a grand jury of all meaning.
E. Examining the Parameters of Grand Jury Secrecy
Although the Supreme Court should recognize a Fifth Amendment right of grand jury 
secrecy, it should also recognize that any such right is not absolute.243 The common-law 
protections attaching to the grand jury required by the Fifth Amendment have always allowed for 
disclosure under certain circumstances.244 To determine the test for the constitutionality of a 
disclosure, one must scrutinize these protections, both as articulated by the courts and as codified 
in Rule 6(e).  
240 Id. at 112 (quoting U.S. v. Sells Engineering, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 423, 443-45, 103 S. Ct. 3133, 3148-49 (1983)).
241 See infra notes 243 to 292 and accompanying text.
242
 John Doe, Inc. I, 481 U.S. at 113-15.
243 E.g., In re Request for Access to Grand Jury Materials Grand Jury No. 81-1, Miami, 833 F.2d 1438, 1443 (11th
Cir. 1987)  (“The policy of grand jury secrecy, whether viewed as a deeply-rooted tradition of the common law or as 
itself implicit in the Fifth Amendment guarantee of indictment for ‘infamous crime,’ is nonetheless a generalized 
one. The balancing that must take place is between the specific need of the Committee for material necessary to its 
constitutionally empowered task of impeachment in this case versus the specific secrecy interests that remain in 
these grand jury materials.”).  
244 See supra notes 31 to 39 and  42 to 67 and accompanying text .
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A review of the existing authorities indicates that for the disclosure of grand jury 
materials to comport with the Fifth Amendment two criteria must be satisfied.  One, a 
“compelling necessity” for the disclosure must be established.245  Two, barring extraordinary 
circumstances, disclosure must be judicially supervised.246
1. The Requirement of Compelling Necessity
The Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co. provides an 
excellent starting point for examining the common-law protections:
The grand jury as a public institution serving the community might suffer if those 
testifying today knew that the secrecy of their testimony would be lifted tomorrow. This 
'indispensable secrecy of grand jury proceedings,' must not be broken except where there 
is a compelling necessity. There are instances when that need will outweigh the 
countervailing policy. But they must be shown with particularity.247
From Proctor & Gamble, it can be gleaned that a person seeking disclosure of grand jury 
materials bears the burden of establishing a “compelling necessity” for the disclosure.248 Such a 
requirement is entirely consistent with the common law as created by the courts and reflected in 
pre-9/11 Rule 6(e). The analysis of whether a compelling necessity exists requires the 
application of a two-pronged test.249 Historically, matters occurring before a federal grand jury 
have been subject to disclosure in only a handful of circumstances: to serve the grand jury;250 to 
protect defendants against prosecutorial misconduct;251  to further the ends of justice in a judicial 
245 See supra notes 30 to 37 and  84 to 89 and accompanying text.
246 See supra notes 38 to 39,  44,  74,and  89 and accompanying text.
247 Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. at 682 (citation omitted).
248 Id.
249 See generally Baggot, 436 U.S. at 479-80.
250 See supra notes 55 to 59 and 64 to 66 and accompanying text.  See also Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(3)(A) (Disclosure 
may be made to “an attorney for the government for use in the performance of such attorney's duty” and to 
government personnel “deemed necessary by an attorney for the government to assist an attorney for the 
government in the performance of such attorney's duty to enforce federal criminal law.” ); Fed. R. Crim. P. 
6(e)(3)(C) ( “An attorney for the government may disclose any grand-jury matter to another federal grand jury.”)
251 See supra note 32 and accompanying text.  See also Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(3)(E)(ii) (Disclosure may be made 
when authorized by the court “at the request of a defendant who shows that a ground may exist to dismiss the 
indictment because of a matter that occurred before the grand jury.”).
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proceeding;252 and to assist state and Indian tribal officials in the prosecution of state and Indian 
tribal crimes.253  In each of these circumstances, disclosure may be required to protect an 
important societal interest.  Not every category of need is sufficient to outweigh the policy of 
protecting grand jury materials.254 Thus, a person seeking disclosure must first establish that his 
or her need is of the right kind.255
But merely establishing that a request falls within one of the recognized categories does 
not establish that disclosure is appropriate.  A person seeking disclosure must prove a 
particularized need exists for disclosure in the case at bar.256 “The particularized need test is one 
of degree . . . .”257 In essence, the courts have said that the need for the grand jury materials 
must be real.
For example, both private parties and governmental officials258 seeking grand jury 
materials for use in another judicial proceeding “must show the material they seek is needed to 
avoid a possible injustice in [the] judicial proceeding, that the need for disclosure is greater than 
the need for secrecy, and that the request is structured to cover only the material so needed.”259
Satisfying this burden is not easy—to overcome the need for secrecy, the party seeking 
disclosure must establish non- disclosure would result in great prejudice.260  Simply showing that 
252 See supra notes 33 to 34 and 83 to 87 and accompanying text.  See also Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(3)(E)(i)  
(Disclosure may be made when authorized by the court “preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial 
proceeding.”).
253 See Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(3)(E)(iii) (Disclosure may be made “at the request of the government if it shows that 
the matter may disclose a violation of state or Indian tribal criminal law, as long as the disclosure is to an 
appropriate state, state-subdivision, or Indian tribal official for the purpose of enforcing that law.”).
254
 Baggot, 436 U.S. at 480 (holding “not every beneficial purpose, or even every valid governmental purpose, is an 
appropriate reason for breaching grand jury secrecy”).
255 Id.
256 See supra notes 36 to 37 and 83 to 87 and accompanying text.
257
 Baggot, 463 U.S. at 480 (emphasis in original).
258 See supra notes 83 to 87 and accompanying text.
259
 Douglas Oil Co., 441 U.S. at 222.
260 Id. at 221.
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the grand jury materials sought are “relevant” is insufficient.261 In determining whether 
disclosure is necessary, a court may weigh the likelihood that the information could be obtained 
through other means.262
Nonetheless, the “particularized need” standard has always had some flexibility.263 It 
involves a balancing of interests, which by its very nature requires that the facts be considered 
on a case-by- case basis.  For instance, “a court might reasonably consider that disclosure to 
Justice Department attorneys poses less risk of further leakage than would disclosure to private 
parties or the general public.”264  Additionally, “under the particularized need standard, the 
district court may weigh the public interest, if any, served by disclosure to a governmental body 
. . . .”
265
The sole exception to the requirement of a showing of particularized need arises when a 
prosecutor seeks to disclose information to other government attorneys involved in federal 
criminal investigations,266 government personnel assisting government attorneys in such 
investigations,267 or federal grand jurors.268 Sharing information with members of these groups 
falls within the definition of disclosure in the sense that it involves “revealing such information 
to other persons,”269 but it does not involve a revelation to a person not intimately involved in 
the functioning of the grand jury.  Two of the three groups, government attorneys and grand 
jurors, have the right to be present in the grand jury room.270  The third, government personnel 
assisting government attorneys, is in some ways akin to a group that has long had access to the 
261
 Sells Eng’g, Inc., 463 U.S. at 444.




 Illinois, 460 U.S. at 567 n. 15.
266 See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
267 See supra notes 56 to 63 and accompanying text.
268 See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
269
 .See generally John Doe, Inc. I, 481 U.S. at 108-09.  
270
 Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(d)(1).
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grand jury room, court stenographers.271  Like the stenographer, the FBI agent charged with 
gathering evidence serves as the handmaid of the grand jury.
Further, since persons within these groups may use the information disclosed only for 
purposes of furthering a grand jury investigation, absent a belief that a need exists for their 
assistance, there would be no logical reason for a prosecutor to disclose it.  In short, a 
particularized need must exist or there would be no disclosure.  The circumstances surrounding
this exception are truly unique.
A finding of compelling necessity is clearly required for disclosure to comport with the 
requirements of the Grand Jury Clause of the Fifth Amendment.  The question then becomes 
who is responsible for making such a finding.
2. The Need for Judicial Review
Throughout history, the decision to disclose grand jury materials has been in the hands of 
the judiciary.272  To understand why this power has been placed in the hands of the judiciary, 
rather than the prosecutor, one must understand the unique status of the grand jury.  “[T]he grand 
jury is mentioned in the Bill of Rights, but not in the body of the Constitution. It has not been 
textually assigned, therefore, to any of the branches described in the first three Articles. It ‘‘is a 
constitutional fixture in its own right.’’”273
But the independence of the grand jury is a fragile thing, dependent upon a delicate 
balance of judicial and prosecutorial oversight.  “A grand jury is clothed with great independence 
in many areas, but it remains an appendage of the court, powerless to perform its investigative 
function without the court's aid, because powerless itself to compel the testimony of 
271 Id.
272 See supra notes 38, 44, 55 to 67, and 88 to 89 and accompanying text.  See also Illinois, 460 U.S. at 567. (“There 
is only one exception to the general prohibition against disclosure without prior court approval, but that exception is 
limited to federal government personnel performing a specified federal law enforcement function.”).
273 U.S. v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 47 (1992) (quoting United States v. Chanen, 549 F.2d 1306, 1312 (9th Cir. 1977)).
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witnesses.”274 If the grand jury is an appendage of the court, it is also an appendage of the 
prosecutor for it is powerless to indict without the consent of the prosecutor.275 The Fifth 
Amendment's “constitutional guarantee [of the right to indictment by a grand jury] presupposes
an investigative body ‘acting independently of either prosecuting attorney or judge.’”276  It is the 
fact that judge and prosecutor must share control that guarantees the grand jury’s independence.
The grand jury is intended to serve as a shield against prosecutorial abuse,277 not a
prosecutor’s private tool. In the words of the old maxim, “Absolute power corrupts absolutely.”
The involvement of the courts serves as a check on any abuse of power.  For example, acting 
under the auspices of a court, a prosecutor may subpoena a witness or a record on the grand 
jury’s behalf.278  Nonetheless, the court retains the right to “quash or modify a subpoena on 
motion if compliance would be ‘unreasonable or oppressive.’”279
In the context of disclosures, it only makes sense that the courts be given the power to 
decide when the veil of secrecy may be lifted.  Grand juries derive their subpoena power from 
the courts280 and while broad, this power is not unlimited.281  Grand juries are intended to 
exercise this power to obtain evidence relating to whether probable cause exists to believe a 
crime has been committed.282  They may not exercise this power for other purposes.283 “In short, 
if grand juries are to be granted extraordinary powers of investigation because of the difficulty 
and importance of their task, the use of those powers ought to be limited as far as reasonably 
274 Brown v. U.S., 359 U.S. 41, 49 (1959), overruled in part by Harris v. U.S., 382 U.S. 162 (1965).
275 In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Special Grand Jury 89-2, 813 F. Supp. 1451, 1462 (D. Colo. 1992)
276 United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 16 (1973) (quoting Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 218).
277 See supra notes 15 to 20 and accompanying text.
278 See generally Fed. R. Crim. P. 17.
279
 U.S. v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 346 n. 4 (1974) (quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 17(c)).
280
 Brown, 359 U.S. at 49.
281
 U.S. v. R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 299 (1991).
282 Id. at 297.
283 E.g., id. at 299.
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possible to the accomplishment of the task.”284  When information obtained via a grand jury 
subpoena is sought for a purpose other than that for which it was intended (i.e., when disclosure 
is sought), the ultimate source of the subpoena power, the court, should be the final arbiter. If it 
is not, the grand jury does become the tool of the prosecutor and a potential for misuse arises.285
The court is also the body best suited to undertake the balancing of interests required to 
determine whether disclosure is warranted. “A court of law . . . is the sole means of protecting 
individual privacy from the airing of private judgment unguided by standards of due process.”286
If decision making were left in the hands of prosecutors, there would be no hearing, no 
presentation of evidence, no record, no guiding precedent, and no possibility of appeal.  Most 
important, there would be no neutral decision maker.  Weighing the various interests involved 
when disclosure of grand jury materials is at issue is a delicate task.287  The decision to remove 
the veil of grand jury secrecy should not be made on an ad hoc basis.
Again, the sole exception to the requirement that disclosure be subject to judicial 
approval arises when a prosecutor seeks to disclose information to other government attorneys 
involved in federal criminal investigations,288 government personnel assisting government 
attorneys in such investigations,289 or federal grand jurors.290  As discussed above, the 
circumstances giving rise to this exception are unique.291  A prosecutor is the best judge of the 
amount and type of investigative support needed to conduct a grand jury investigation.  In 
284
 Sells Eng’g, Inc.  463 U.S. at 434-435.
285 See id. at 432-33.
286 In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Special Grand Jury 89-2, 813 F. Supp. at 1458.
287
 Schmidt, 115 F.2d at 397.
288 See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
289 See supra notes 56 to 63 and accompanying text.
290 See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
291 See supra notes 266 to 271 and accompanying text.
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addition, “interlocutory appeal of issues disruptive of a grand jury investigation are not 
favored.”292 The sheer number of requests would overwhelm the system.
Based on the foregoing, to comport with the Fifth Amendment right of grand jury 
secrecy, the disclosure of grand jury materials must be the result of a compelling necessity and it 
must be judicially approved.
III. Rule 6(e), the Constitution, & Sound Public Policy
The exceptions to the doctrine of grand secrecy created by the USA PATRIOT Act293 and 
the Homeland Security Act of 2002294 fundamentally differ from the traditional exceptions to 
this doctrine.295 These permanent additions to the legal landscape were enacted in haste and 
buried deep within massive bills.  They were a gut reaction to tragic events.  But good law rarely 
results from gut reactions.  If Congress intends to permanently alter the grand jury system that is 
older than our nation itself, it should do so with thought and great care.
The 340 plus page USA PATRIOT Act was conceived, written, and enacted within six 
weeks of the attacks of September 11.  The typical committee hearings and debates surrounding 
legislation of this scope (or any scope for that matter) were missing.296  Indeed, in the immediate 
aftermath of the attacks, only the most courageous of legislators dared voice dissent for fear of 
being branded unpatriotic.  Surely, this is not the careful deliberation envisioned by the framers 
of our Constitution.  
292
 S. Rep. No. 95-707, at 13 n. 12 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 527, 536.  “‘The duration of its (the 
grand jury’s) life, frequently short, is limited by statute.  It is no less important to safeguard against undue 
interruption the inquiry instituted by a grand jury than to protect from delay the progress of a trial after an 
indictment has been found.’”  Id. (quoting Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 327 (1940)).
293 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct 
Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 203, 115 Stat. 272, 272 (2001).
294
 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 895, 116 Stat. 2135, 2256-57 (2002).
295 See supra notes 103 to 129 and 165 to 167 and accompanying text.
296See generally Emmanuel Gross, The Influence Of Terrorist Attacks On Human Rights In The United States:  The 
Aftermath Of September 11, 2001, 28 N.C. J. Int’l L. & Comm. Reg. 1, 3 (2002) (“Congress took action without a 
proper debate on the Patriot Act's ramifications and without providing the American public with an opportunity to 
voice its opinion, despite the enormous impact of the Patriot Act on the daily lives of all American citizens.”).
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During times of turmoil, the rights enshrined in our Constitution face their greatest 
threat.297  “In such periods the times seem so different, so out of joint, the threats from within or 
without seem so unprecedented, that the Constitution itself is perceived by many persons as 
anachronistic, or at least rigidly, unrealistically formalistic.”298  Congress must be ever aware of 
the dangers of allowing momentary fears to drive public policy.  
The President has already called upon Congress to save the Homeland Security exception 
from oblivion by enacting technical amendments.299  Rather than apply a simple patch to Rule 
6(e), Congress should take the opportunity to review and repair any damage inflicted by the 
recent amendments.   It should examine the PATRIOT intelligence exception and the Homeland 
Security exception under the lens of the Constitution and the lens of sound public policy.
A. The PATRIOT Intelligence Exception
A careful study of the PATRIOT intelligence exception reveals that its application results 
in disclosures causing systemic injury to the grand jury process.  As written and applied, the 
exception violates the Grand Jury Clause of the Fifth Amendment.300  Even if the constitutional 
problems are ignored, sound public policy reasons exist for reworking this exception.301
1. The Fifth Amendment Analysis
To satisfy the Fifth Amendment, any disclosure must be justified by a compelling 
necessity and must be judicially supervised.302 The PATRIOT intelligence exception sanctions
disclosures that satisfy neither criterion.  It permits a prosecutor to disclose “any grand-jury 
matter involving foreign intelligence, counterintelligence . . . , or foreign intelligence information 
297
 Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and fhe First Amendment, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 449, 456-57 (1985).
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. . . to any federal law enforcement, intelligence, protective, immigration, national defense, or 
national security official to assist the official receiving the information in the performance of that 
official's duties.”303
Under the two-pronged compelling necessity test, the disclosure sought must be of a kind 
that serves an important societal interest,304 and the need for disclosure must be shown with 
particularity.305  The PATRIOT intelligence exception almost certainly satisfies the first prong of 
this test.  Although disclosure for purposes of promoting national security has never been 
included among the recognized categories of disclosure, society’s interest in protecting the 
nation and its citizens against hostile acts, such as terrorism and sabotage, can hardly be less 
significant than its interest in the enforcement of public or private rights in a civil action, a long-
recognized category of disclosure.306 Few would argue that if grand jury testimony uncovers a 
legitimate threat to the security of the nation, it should not be revealed to the proper authorities.
But the PATRIOT intelligence exception does not satisfy the second prong of the test.  It 
does not require persons seeking disclosure to show a particularized need.  This exception is 
written in the broadest possible terms—disclosure is not limited to instances in which the United 
States is faced with some sort of threat, immediate or otherwise. For example, under the 
definition of “foreign intelligence” incorporated into the exception,307 a prosecutor would be 
permitted to report a foreign student’s membership in a particular mosque to the F.B.I. or the 
C.I.A. The exception does not require any evidence of wrongdoing.  If you happen to be a non-
303
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U.S. citizen, any of your activities may be reported to the listed federal officials whether they 
have any need for the information or not.
It is not simply the language of the PATRIOT intelligence exception that is troubling—
none of the pre-9/11 exceptions contained in Rule 6(e) expressly require a showing of 
particularized need—the more troubling aspect of this exception is the manner in which it has 
been interpreted.  The interpretation of this exception by the Department of Justice as reflected in 
the information-sharing guidelines promulgated by the Attorney General supports the idea that a 
showing “particularized need” is not required.308 In fact, the guidelines make disclosure 
mandatory.309 If information falls under the categories described in Rule 6(e), it “shall be 
shared.”310 In the long history of the doctrine of grand-jury secrecy, no exception has ever been 
used to mandate disclosure.
The vast number of disclosures mandated by the guidelines is unprecedented.   To 
illustrate, as discussed above,311 the broad definition of “foreign intelligence” covers every act by 
a foreign citizen, here or abroad.  If the mandate provided by the guidelines is to be followed to 
the letter, a prosecutor would be charged with reporting a non-citizen’s trip to the grocery for 
milk and bread.  As directed by Congress,312 the Department of Justice is creating a training 
program that will help prosecutors and other law enforcement officials identify foreign 
308 See generally supra notes 117 to 122 and accompanying text.
309
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intelligence information,313 but there is no reason to believe that the Department will ignore the 
language of Rule 6 and instruct prosecutors to more narrowly define this term.
The guidelines do permit a prosecutor to petition the Attorney General for an 
exemption.314   However, the focus appears to be on protecting criminal investigations, not on 
balancing the various interests involved.315 No one seems to be watching out for the interests of 
grand jury targets.  A presumption of disclosure exists.316  In sum, as interpreted by the Attorney 
General, the Patriot intelligence exception not only permits disclosure without a showing of 
compelling need, it endorses such disclosure.
The PATRIOT intelligence exception also fails to satisfy the criterion that any disclosure 
be judicially supervised.317 The decision to disclose is completely in the hands of the Justice 
Department.  Indeed, the court under whose authority the evidence was gathered by the grand 
jury is not so much as given a list of those persons to whom the information is disclosed.318  The 
exception contains no mechanism for preventing its misuse.
The PATRIOT intelligence exception creates a material breach of the protection afforded 
grand jury secrecy by the Fifth Amendment.  The failure to require a showing of particularized 
need and the failure to require judicial supervision create a situation in which enormous numbers 
of disclosures can, have,319 and will be made.  The cumulative effect of these disclosures will be 
313
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to chill the participation of grand jury witnesses, and thereby cause systemic injury to the grand 
jury process.320
2. The Public Policy Analysis
Even setting aside the issue of its constitutionality, strong public policy arguments exist 
for the amendment of the PATRIOT intelligence exception.  The collective wisdom of nearly a 
millennium has been that secrecy is “indispensable” to grand jury proceedings.321 “[W]hen 
disclosure is permitted, it is to be done ‘discretely and limitedly.”322 The PATRIOT intelligence 
exception permits disclosure that is hardly discrete and far from limited.323 This exception
permits so many disclosures that it threatens to swallow the rule of secrecy.  Upon closer 
examination, Congress will discover its national security objectives could be met without 
resorting to such a drastic alteration of the grand jury system.
There can be little doubt that under some circumstances, the societal interest in national 
security outweighs the societal interest in grand jury secrecy. But that is not always the case.  
Every piece of information that falls within the broad definitions of foreign intelligence or 
counterintelligence or foreign intelligence information is not vital (or even relevant) to national 
security.  The PATRIOT intelligence exception lacks a reasonable mechanism for separating the 
wheat from the chafe.
The most troubling aspect of this exception is the complete absence of judicial 
supervision.324 First, the lack of judicial supervision makes it more likely that intelligence 
information obtained in the course of ordinary grand jury investigations will be disclosed.  Quite 
simply, there is no one there to say “no” to disclosure based on lack of relevancy or need.  In 
320 See generally supra notes 216 to 227 and accompanying text.
321 Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. at 682.  See also supra notes 11 to 26, 41 to 48, and 207 to 227.
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fact, the information-sharing guidelines issued by the Attorney General in effect prohibit anyone 
from saying “no” to disclosure based on such considerations.325
Second, the lack of judicial supervision creates the temptation on the part of the Justice 
Department to abuse the grand jury system.326  Instead of using the powers of the grand jury to 
determine whether probable cause exists to believe that a crime has taken place, prosecutors 
could begin using the grand jury as a tool of the intelligence community.
The information-sharing guidelines already provide the Director of the CIA with a direct 
role in the disclosure process.  They foster an unhealthy entanglement between the Justice 
Department and the CIA.  The Director is charged with helping the Attorney General establish 
any formalized exceptions to the rule of disclosure,327 assisting in the design of a training 
curriculum which will allow law enforcement officials to identify intelligence information,328
and consulting with the Attorney General on decisions relating to whether to exempt specific 
materials from disclosure.329  Further, Guideline 6 permits recipients of information to request 
“additional information,” “clarification,” or “amplification.”330  If a prosecutor knows that the 
CIA wishes additional facts on a matter unrelated to the grand jury’s criminal investigation, 
directing questions on that matter to a witness would be all too easy.331
Information sharing between federal law enforcement agencies and intelligence agencies 
may well be necessary to safeguard national security, but such sharing could be fostered without 
the excessive entanglement created by the PATRIOT intelligence exception.  The dangers to our 
325 See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
326
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civil rights posed by such entanglement are well documented.332  The simple requirement of 
judicial supervision could prevent federal law enforcement agencies and intelligence agencies 
from heading down a very slippery slope.
The question then becomes whether any valid reason exists for omitting such a 
requirement from the PATRIOT intelligence exception.  Several different justifications have 
been set forth for the lack of judicial supervision.333
The initial justifications were provided by members of the Bush Administration.334  The 
version of the PATRIOT intelligence exception approved by the House Committee on the 
Judiciary required judicial supervision.335  It would have allowed disclosure:
when permitted by a court at the request of an attorney for the government, upon a 
showing that the matters pertain to international or domestic terrorism (as defined 
in section 2331 of title 18, United States Code) or national security, to any Federal 
law enforcement, intelligence, national security, national defense, protective, 
immigration personnel, or to the President or Vice President of the United States, 
for the performance of official duties.336
A desire for judicial supervision also existed among at least some members of the Senate.  
Senator Patrick Leahy proposed to the Administration that judicial oversight of disclosure to 
intelligence officials of both wiretap information and grand jury materials was warranted.337  On 
September 30, 2001, the Administration agreed to judicial oversight, but within two days it 
reneged.338 According to Senator Leahy,
[t]he Administration offered three reasons for reneging on the original deal. First, 
they claimed that the involvement of the court would inhibit Federal investigators 
and attorneys from disclosing information needed by intelligence and national 
security officials. Second, they said the courts might not have adequate security 
332 See generally id. at 1277 (describing the massive abuse of federal law enforcement powers during the Cold War).
333 See infra notes 334 to 336 and 349 to 350.
334 See 147 Cong. Rec. S10555 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 2001) (statement of Senator Patrick Leahy).
335 H.R. Rpt. 107-236(I), 107th Cong., 1st Sess., § 353 (Oct. 11, 2001).  
336 Id. (emphasis added).
337 147 Cong. Rec. at S10555-S10556.
338 Id.
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and therefore should not be told that information was disclosed for intelligence or 
national security purposes. And third, they said the President's constitutional 
powers under Article II give him authority to get whatever foreign intelligence he 
needs to exercise his national security responsibilities.339
The first argument (i.e., that judicial supervision would somehow inhibit the disclosure of 
needed information) is specious.  If information truly is “needed” by intelligence and national 
security officials, there is no reason to believe that a federal judge would not authorize its 
disclosure.  By way of example, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, which is charged 
under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978340 with approving electronic surveillance 
and physical searches for intelligence purposes, has rarely refused a request.341  The seeming 
distrust of the judiciary by the executive branch is alarming.
The Bush Administration may also have been distrustful of the prosecutors themselves, 
fearing that prosecutors would be unwilling to expend the effor t needed to obtain court approval.
After taking part in the Congressional Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities 
339 Id. at S10556.  Senator Leahy provided this explanation when discussing the Administration’s reasons for 
reneging on its agreement to permit judicial supervision of the disclosure of wiretap information.  Id. at S10555-
S10556.  Presumably, it reneged on its agreement to permit judicial supervision of the disclosure of grand jury 
information for the same reasons.
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before and after the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, Senator Richard Shelby concluded 
that the PATRIOT intelligence exception was enacted because the Department of Justice used 
Rule 6(e) as an unwarranted excuse to avoid sharing information with the intelligence 
community.342  It claimed Rule 6(e) protection for non-grand jury materials.343  “[W]orking from 
the assumption that it would be easier to change the law itself than to fix a parochial and 
dysfunctional institutional culture that used the Rule as an excuse to prevent all 
informationsharing [sic], [Attorney General Ashcroft and Congress] determined simply to 
change Rule 6(e) to permit information-sharing with intelligence officials.”344  Indeed, the law 
now requires law enforcement officials to share information.345
The fact that prosecutors may have abused Rule 6(e) protections in the past does not 
justify a wholesale change in the rule, and it certainly does not justify a change that eliminates 
judicial oversight of the process.  If the institutional culture within the Department of Justice is 
dysfunctional, it must be changed from within.
The second argument (i.e., that the courts lack adequate security to be entrusted with 
sensitive information) is equally unsound.  First, the courts certainly have as much security as 
342
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many of the federal agencies and departments that will be the recipients of information disclosed 
under the PATRIOT intelligence exception.  A federal court poses no greater security risk than 
does the Social Security Administration.  Second, the problem of security could easily be 
overcome by creating a court that is akin to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court 
established under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.346  For example, the chief 
judge for each district could appoint a judge to hear all requests under the PATRIOT intelligence 
exception.  That judge could receive special training and could employ heightened security 
measures.  Appeals could be made to a specialized court of review appointed by the Chief 
Justice.  Multitudes of ways exist in which any security concerns might be addressed.
The third argument (i.e., that the President could employ powers under Article II to 
compel disclosure) begs the question of whether he should do so.  The proposition that the 
President has an absolute right to go digging through grand jury materials is dubious at best—no 
president has ever exercised such a power.  Even assuming this power exists, exercising it in the 
indiscriminate manner permitted and even mandated under the PATRIOT intelligence exception 
would be foolhardy.  Our system has checks and balances for a reason. “In fact the whole theory 
of [the grand jury’s] function is that it belongs to no branch of the institutional Government, 
serving as a kind of buffer or referee between the Government and the people.”347  The President
should and must trust that the courts will recognize his or her needs.348
Another justification was hinted at by  the Department of Justice in its response to 
questions by the U.S. House of Representatives’ Committee on the Judiciary.349  In explaining 
346 See generally 50 U.S.C. § 1803 (2000 & Supp. 2001).    The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court consists of 
eleven district court judges selected by the Chief Justice.  Id. § 1803(a).  The court is conducted in secret in 
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how the PATRIOT intelligence exception aids in the information-sharing process, the 
Department of Justice noted the “practical difficulties” involved in utilizing the traditional 
exceptions.350
For example, in discussing the problems involved with using the law-enforcement 
exception, it pointed out that the exception requires a government attorney to provide the court 
with the name of each individual receiving information under the exception.351  According to the 
Department of Justice, “[i]n the context of the 9/11 investigations and other terrorism 
investigations that are national and international in scope and may involve literally thousands of 
investigators and dozens of grand juries, this requirement was onerous and a diversion of 
resources from investigative activity.”352  If the Department of Justice views merely reporting 
information to a court as “onerous,” it likely views obtaining approval for disclosure as 
extraordinarily burdensome. It cannot be denied that permitting disclosure without court 
approval saves the Department of Justice money.  But the Supreme Court has never viewed cost 
savings as a valid reason for lifting the veil of grand jury secrecy.353 If the Department of Justice 
requires additional clerical or other help that is simply a cost society must bear.
Any “practical difficulties” arising from the time required to obtain court approval could 
easily be addressed in the text of the rule.  The information-sharing guidelines issued by the 
Attorney General already distinguish between the treatment of materials relating to “a potential 
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materials subject to disclosure under the PATRIOT intelligence exception by permitting a forty-
eight hour delay in the disclosure of the latter.356 When an immediate threat exists to national 
security, prosecutors could be permitted to disclose without judicial approval.  In contrast, when 
time is not of the essence, a fast-track judicial approval procedure could be used. 
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that no valid justification exists for the absence of 
judicial supervision.  Congress can easily amend Rule 6(e) to protect important national security 
interests without destroying the secrecy that is indispensable to grand jury proceedings.
B. The Homeland Security Exception
An examination of the Homeland Security exception reveals the same constitutional 
violations created by the PATRIOT intelligence exception.  As written, the exception would 
violate the Grand Jury Clause of the Fifth Amendment.357  Again, even if the constitutional 
issues are ignored, sound public policy reasons exist for redrafting this exception.358  Should 
Congress elect to make the technical amendments necessary to revive this exception, it should 
also make the substantive amendments necessary to protect the doctrine of grand jury secrecy.
1. The Fifth Amendment Analysis
To satisfy the Fifth Amendment, any disclosure of grand jury materials must be justified 
by a compelling necessity and must be judicially supervised.359  The Homeland Security 
terrorist groups or individuals or threats posed by such groups or individuals to the United States, 
United States persons, or United States interests, or to those of other nations, or to 
communications between such groups or individuals, or information relating to groups or 
individuals reasonably believed to be assisting or associated with them.
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355
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exception authorizes disclosures that satisfy neither criterion.  This exception permits disclosure 
without judicial approval:
when matters involve a threat of actual or potential attack or other grave hostile 
acts of a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power, domestic or international 
sabotage, domestic or international terrorism, or clandestine intelligence gathering 
activities by an intelligence service or network of a foreign power or by an agent 
of a foreign power, within the United States or elsewhere, to any appropriate 
federal, state, local, or foreign government official for the purpose of preventing 
or responding to such a threat. 360
Under the two-pronged compelling necessity test, the disclosure sought must be of a kind 
that serves an important societal interest,361 and the need for disclosure must be shown with 
particularity.362  Little doubt exists that the Homeland security exception satisfies the first prong 
of this test.  This exception is more narrowly drawn than the PATRIOT intelligence exception in 
one important respect.  The PATRIOT intelligence exception permits the disclosure of 
information that does not relate to a direct threat of some type to the United States.  As discussed 
above,363 “foreign intelligence” could involve virtually any act by a non-citizen.  In contrast, the 
Homeland Security exception for the most part focuses on activities, such as attack, sabotage, 
and terrorism that do involve a direct threat to public safety.  Preventing such activities 
unquestionably serves a long-recognized societal interest.364
However, the Homeland Security exception fails to satisfy the second prong of the test 
for it permits disclosure without a showing of particularized need.  Not every situation 
encompassed within the broad terms of the exception involves a real threat to public safety.  For 
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instance, a multitude of actions could be disclosed under the undefined threat of “terrorism.”365
The county sheriff obviously needs to know that there are plans afoot to place a bomb in the 
county courthouse, but does not necessarily need to know that there are plans afoot for a peaceful 
protest within the courthouse. This exception could easily become a tool used against those who 
might voice public dissent.
Too, the exception permits disclosure to a wide range of officials, including everyone 
from the President of the United States to the mayor of a village in the middle of Tibet.366  The 
question of which official or officials have a genuine need to know about a particular “threat” is 
far from clear. In sum, as written, the Homeland Security exception permits disclosure when no 
compelling need for disclosure exists.
Since the exception has yet to become effective, it is difficult to predict how it will be 
applied.367 Although section 895 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 indicates the Attorney 
General and the Director of the CIA will jointly issue guidelines governing the use of grand jury 
materials by state, foreign, and local officials who receive such information pursuant to the 
Homeland Security exception, it does not require that any guidelines be issued governing the 
disclosure of such information.368 Still, there is no reason to believe that the Attorney General 
will not follow the precedent set in the interpretation of the PATRIOT intelligence exception by
making disclosure mandatory.
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The Homeland Security exception also fails to satisfy the criterion that any disclosure be 
judicially supervised.369  The language of the exception permits unilateral action by prosecutors.  
If a substantial threat is imminent, the government’s interest in protecting national security may 
well outweigh any right to grand jury secrecy and such unilateral action may be constitutionally 
permissible.  However, the language of the exception permits unilateral action even in the 
absence of an imminent threat.  It excludes judicial participation in the decision-making process 
when no need for such exclusion exists. 
As with the PATRIOT intelligence exception, the court is provided with nothing more 
than a vague, after-the-fact notice that “information” was disclosed to a particular department, 
agency, or entity.370  No meaningful role exists for the judiciary in this process.
Should Congress enact the technical amendments requested by President Bush and bring 
the Homeland Security exception into being, it will set the stage for a material breach of the 
protection afforded grand jury secrecy by the Fifth Amendment.  Congress’ failure to require a 
showing of particularized need and to allow a meaningful role for the courts creates a situation in 
which vast numbers of disclosures can and will be made.  Again, the cumulative effect of these 
disclosures will be to chill the participation of grand jury witnesses, and thereby cause systemic 
injury to the grand jury process.371
2. The Public Policy Analysis
Even assuming that the Homeland Security exception poses no constitutional problems, 
strong public policy arguments support its amendment.  In creating this exception, Congress took 
measures far beyond those necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of preventing and responding 
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65
to threats to our national security.  It unnecessarily sacrificed the “public interest” in secrecy.372
Judicious amendment of the Homeland Security exception could protect the doctrine of grand 
jury secrecy while actually furthering the goal of preventing and responding to threats to national 
security.
Few would disagree with Congress that a homeland security exception should exist in 
some form.  If information regarding a true threat to national security becomes known during a 
grand jury session, it should be disclosed to the proper authorities.  No one wants a repeat of the 
tragic events of September 11, 2001.  Grand jury materials have been disclosed for lesser 
reasons.373
But in drafting the Homeland Security exception, Congress made some critical mistakes.  
First, it failed to set needed parameters in terms of the types of information that could be 
disclosed under the exception.  Failing to define terms, such as “terrorism,”374 denies those 
seeking to apply the exception much needed guidance and opens the doors to abuse of this 
exception.  It allows the disclosure of activities that do not pose any threat to national security.
Second, Congress again created a system that has no checks on the use of power by the 
executive branch.  The judiciary lacks the ability to identify, much less prevent or punish, any 
abuses of this exception.  Further, “[s]ince the Department of Justice has taken the position that 
the intelligence committees of Congress should not be permitted to see any grand jury 
information, this means that there is no oversight of what use is made of grand jury material 
passed to the Intelligence Community.”375  It is sadly ironic that the same information that is 
372 See generally Douglas Oil Co. of California, 441 U.S. at 218-23.  See also supra notes 11 to 26, 41 to 48, and 
207 to 227.
373
 For instance, where a particularized need is established, grand jury materials may be disclosed for use in other 
civil and criminal proceedings.  Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(3)(E)(i).
374 See supra notes 169 to 170, 365 and accompanying text.
375
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entrusted to a foreign official may not be shared with the judicial or legislative branches of our 
own government.  
Certainly, some situations exist in which it would be impracticable to require prosecutors 
to seek judicial approval—if a substantial, imminent threat exists, a prosecutor may need to shout 
what he or she knows from the rooftops, and the law should permit such disclosures.  But not 
every situation requires immediate disclosure.  Indeed, not every situation requires any 
disclosure. As well, there is no reason why prosecutors could not at the very least provide a list 
of those receiving information to the court.376
Prosecutors and judges can and should work hand in hand to determine when the public’s 
interest in national security outweighs its interest in grand jury secrecy.  It should be the role of 
the prosecutor to identify information that may evidence a threat and to immediately bring that 
information to the attention of the court.  It should be the role of the court to quickly weigh all of 
the competing interests and to determine whether disclosure is warranted and the conditions 
under which it should be made.
Such a weighing of interests benefits all concerned.  As discussed above, grand jury 
targets have a strong interest in a grand jury system which protects against unwarranted 
disclosures,377 but they are not alone in their need for secrecy for “the proper functioning of our 
grand jury system depends upon the secrecy of grand jury proceedings.”378  The public and the 
government have an interest in maintaining a system in which grand jury witnesses feel free to 
step forward and testify “fully and frankly,” and in which targets are not provided the 
Reform in the U.S. Intelligence Community:  Additional Views of Senator Richard Shelby, Vice Chairman, Senate 
Select Committee on Intelligence, S Rep. 107-351 at n. 123 (2002).  “The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 
tried to provide for such oversight in its FY03 authorization bill, see S2506 (107 Cong., 2d Sess.), at § 306, but this 
provision was removed in conference at the insistence of the Administration.”  Id.
376 See generally supra notes 351 to 353 and accompanying text.
377 See supra notes 216 to 227 and accompanying text.
378 E.g., Douglas Oil Co., 441 U.S. at 218.
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opportunity to flee or intimidate witnesses or jurors.379 Secrecy is necessary to the discovery of 
the truth.
While the Bush Administration has fought hard to create the new exceptions to the rule of 
secrecy, it too apparently recognizes the value of secrecy.  Early in 2003, the Administration
reportedly floated legislation that would amend Rule 6(e) yet again to tighten the rule of 
secrecy.380 Section 206 of a proposal known as the Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003
would have imposed a requirement of secrecy on grand jury witnesses in some circumstances.381
Although this proposal now appears to have been dropped, it evidences the vital role of the 
doctrine of grand jury secrecy to the grand jury system.
Yet another person with a substantial interest in maintaining grand jury secrecy is the 
grand jury witness.  Under the Homeland Security exception as written, no one protects the 
interests of the witness.  No one is charged with considering whether the disclosure of the 
testimony of a witness might place that witness, or perhaps a relative in a far off land, in danger.
The danger of intimidation, injury, or even death should not be taken lightly—grand jury 
tampering does occur.382 Judicial supervision of any proposed disclosure is necessary to protect 
grand jury witnesses from harm.
379 Id. at 219.
380
 Patriot Act II (draft), available at http://www.eff.org/Censorship/Terrorism_militias/patriot2draft.html.
381 Id.  Specifically, the description of section 206, entitled “Grand Jury Information in Terrorism Cases” states,
This section amends Rule 6(e)(2)(B) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to make 
witnesses and persons to whom subpoenas are directed subject to grand jury secrecy rules in cases 
where serious adverse consequences may otherwise result, including danger to the national 
security or to the life or physical safety of an individual, flight from prosecution, destruction of or 
tampering with evidence, intimidation of a potential witness, or other serious jeopardy to an 
investigation. The provision would permit witnesses and recipients of grand jury subpoenas to 
consult with counsel regarding the subpoena and any testimony, but would impose the same 
secrecy obligations on counsel.
Id.
382
 In the late1970’s the General Accounting Office (GAO) documented “343 grand jury witnesses who had their 
identities revealed before any indictments were returned by grand juries, including 5 who were murdered, 10 who 
were intimidated, and 1 who disappeared.”  Report to the Congress of the United States by the Comptroller General:  
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Judicial supervision may even further the goal of obtaining helpful intelligence 
information from grand jury witnesses.  If the public begins to perceive grand juries as the tool of 
the intelligence community, revealing anything and everything, witnesses may withhold 
important information out of fear.  Limiting disclosures to materials involving truly vital 
information may actually help the system to acquire such information.
One cannot dispute that it might be more convenient for the Department of Justice to act 
unilaterally in making the decision to disclose, but “’doubtless all arbitrary powers, well 
executed, are the most convenient.’”383 “’[Y]et let it be again remembered that delays and little 
inconveniences in the forms of justice are the price that all free nations must pay for their liberty 
in more substantial matters.’”384
Based on the foregoing, Congress should revive the Homeland Security exception, but in 
doing so, should amend this exception to protect the secrecy that is essential to grand jury 
proceedings.
IV.   A Proposed Amendment to Rule 6(e)
To address the concerns outlined above, I propose that Congress amend Federal 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(2),(3) to read as follows:385
 (e) Recording and Disclosing the Proceedings.
(2) Secrecy.
(A) No obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in 
accordance with Rule 6(e)(2)(B).
(B) Unless these rules provide otherwise, the following persons must not 
disclose a matter occurring before the grand jury:
(i) a grand juror;
(ii) an interpreter;
More Guidance and Supervision Needed over Federal Grand Jury Proceedings 6 (Oct. 16, 1980).  Since the GAO 
studied only a few of the federal districts, these numbers represent only “the tip of the iceberg.”  Id.
383 Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 545 (U.S.1884) (Harlan, J. dissenting) (quoting Blackstone, 4 Bl. Comm. 
349, 350.).  
384 Id. (quoting Blackstone, 4 Bl. Comm. 349, 350.).
385
 The substantive changes are underlined.
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(iii) a court reporter;
(iv) an operator of a recording device;
(v) a person who transcribes recorded testimony;
(vi) an attorney for the government; or
(vii) a person to whom disclosure is made under Rule 6(e)(3)(A)(ii) 
or (iii).
(3) Exceptions.
(A) Disclosure of a grand-jury matter--other than the grand jury's 
deliberations or any grand juror's vote--may be made to:
(i) an attorney for the government for use in performing that 
attorney's duty;
(ii) any government personnel--including those of a state or state 
subdivision or of an Indian tribe--that an attorney for the government 
considers necessary to assist in performing that attorney's duty to enforce 
federal criminal law; or
(iii) a person authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 3322.
(B) A person to whom information is disclosed under Rule 6(e)(3)(A)(ii) 
may use that information only to assist an attorney for the government in 
performing that attorney's duty to enforce federal criminal law. An attorney 
for the government must promptly provide the court that impaneled the 
grand jury with the names of all persons to whom a disclosure has been 
made, and must certify that the attorney has advised those persons of their 
obligation of secrecy under this rule.
(C) An attorney for the government may disclose any grand-jury matter to 
another federal grand jury.
(D) An attorney for the government may disclose any grand-jury matter
when the matter involves information that he or she reasonably believes may 
evidence an imminent, substantial threat to the United States homeland, its 
critical infrastructure, its key resources (whether physical or electronic), or 
its persons or interests worldwide, to any appropriate federal, state, local, or 
foreign government official for the purpose of preventing or responding to 
such a threat.
(i) Any official who receives information under Rule 6(e)(3)(D)  may use 
that information only as necessary in the conduct of that person's official 
duties subject to any limitations on the unauthorized disclosure of such 
information.
(ii) Any state, local, or foreign official who receives information 
pursuant to Rule 6(e)(3)(D) shall use that information only consistent with 
such guidelines as the Attorney General and Director of Central 
Intelligence shall jointly issue.
(iii) After a disclosure made pursuant to Rule 6(e)(3)(D), an attorney for 
the government must promptly provide the court with a notice containing 
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the names of all persons to whom a disclosure has been made, a brief 
description of the information disclosed and the reason for the disclosure,
and a certification that the attorney has advised such persons of any 
obligation of secrecy under this rule or any applicable guidelines.  This 
notice shall be filed under seal.
(E) The court may authorize disclosure--at a time, in a manner, and subject 
to any other conditions that it directs--of a grand-jury matter preliminarily to 
or in connection with a judicial proceeding.
(F) The court may authorize disclosure--at a time, in a manner, and subject 
to any other conditions that it directs--at the request of a defendant who 
shows that a ground may exist to dismiss the indictment because of a matter 
that occurred before the grand jury.
(G) The court may authorize disclosure--at a time, in a manner, and 
subject to any other conditions that it directs-- at the request of the 
government if it shows that the matter may disclose a violation of state or 
Indian tribal criminal law, as long as the disclosure is to an appropriate state, 
state-subdivision, or Indian tribal official for the purpose of enforcing that 
law.
(H) The court may authorize disclosure--at a time, in a manner, and 
subject to any other conditions that it directs--at the request of the 
government if it shows that the matter may disclose a violation of military 
criminal law under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, as long as the 
disclosure is to an appropriate military official for the purpose of enforcing 
that law.
(I) The court may authorize disclosure--at a time, in a manner, and subject 
to any other conditions that it directs--at the request of the government if it 
shows that the  matter involves information that may evidence a substantial 
threat to the United States homeland, its critical infrastructure, its key 
resources (whether physical or electronic), or its persons or interests 
worldwide, or it shows that such matters involve clandestine intelligence 
gathering activities by an intelligence service or network of a foreign power 
or by an agent of a foreign power, within the United States or elsewhere, to 
any appropriate federal, state, local, or foreign government official for the 
purpose of preventing or responding to such a threat or such activities.
(i) Any official who receives information under Rule 6(e)(3)(I) may use 
that information only as necessary in the conduct of that person's official 
duties subject to any limitations on the unauthorized disclosure of such 
information.
(ii) In addition to any conditions imposed by the court, any state, local, 
or foreign official who receives information pursuant to Rule 6(e)(3)(I) 
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may use that information only consistent with such guidelines as the 
Attorney General and Director of Central Intelligence shall jointly issue.
(J) The court may authorize disclosure--at a time, in a manner, and subject 
to any other conditions that it directs--at the request of the government if it 
shows that such matters involve significant foreign intelligence, 
counterintelligence (as defined in 50 U.S.C. §  401a), or foreign intelligence 
information (as defined in Rule 6(e)(3)(J)(iii)) to any federal law 
enforcement, intelligence, protective, immigration, national defense, or 
national security official to assist the official receiving the information in the 
performance of that official's duties.
(i) Any federal official who receives information under Rule 6(e)(3)(J)
may use the information only as necessary in the conduct of that person's 
official duties subject to any limitations on the unauthorized disclosure of 
such information.
(ii) As used in Rule 6(e)(3)(J), the term "foreign intelligence 
information" means:
(a) information, whether or not it concerns a United States person, that 
relates to the ability of the United States to protect against--
• actual or potential attack or other grave hostile acts of a foreign 
power or its agent;
• sabotage or international terrorism by a foreign power or its agent; 
or
• clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service or 
network of a foreign power or by its agent; or
(b) information, whether or not it concerns a United States person, 
with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory that relates to--
• the national defense or the security of the United States; or
• the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States.
(K) A petition to disclose a grand-jury matter under Rule 6(e)(3)(E) must 
be filed in the district where the grand jury convened. Unless the hearing is 
ex parte--as it may be when the government is the petitioner--the petitioner 
must serve the petition on, and the court must afford a reasonable 
opportunity to appear and be heard to:
(i) an attorney for the government;
(ii) the parties to the judicial proceeding; and
(iii) any other person whom the court may designate.
(L) If the petition to disclose arises out of a judicial proceeding in another 
district, the petitioned court must transfer the petition to the other court 
unless the petitioned court can reasonably determine whether disclosure is 
proper. If the petitioned court decides to transfer, it must send to the 
transferee court the material sought to be disclosed, if feasible, and a written 
evaluation of the need for continued grand-jury secrecy. The transferee court 
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must afford those persons identified in Rule 6(e)(3)(K) a reasonable 
opportunity to appear and be heard.
(M) In Rule 6(e)(3)(D) and Rule 6(e)(3)(I), 
(i)  the term “substantial threat” means a threat of actual or potential 
attack or other grave hostile acts by a foreign power or an agent of a 
foreign power, sabotage (as defined in 18 U.S.C. §§ 2152-2156), domestic 
or international terrorism (as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2331), or use of 
weapons of mass destruction.
(ii) the term  “information” as it relates to “a threat of actual or potential 
attack or other grave hostile acts by a foreign power or an agent of a 
foreign power” means all information relating  to the existence, 
organization, capabilities, communications, plans, intentions, 
vulnerabilities, means of finance or material support, or activities of a 
foreign power or an agent of a foreign power relating to such threat, or to 
the same information relating to groups or individuals reasonably believed 
to be assisting or associated with them.
(iii) the term “information” as it relates to a threat of “sabotage” means 
all information relating to the existence, organization, capabilities, plans, 
intentions, vulnerabilities, means of finance or material support, or 
activities of saboteurs or threats posed by such groups or individuals to the 
United States, its persons, or its interests or those of other associate 
nations (as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2151), or to communications between 
such groups or individuals, or to the same information relating to groups 
or individuals reasonably believed to be assisting or associated with them.
(iv) the term “information” as it relates to a threat of “domestic or 
international terrorism” threat means all information relating to the 
existence, organization, capabilities, plans, intentions, vulnerabilities, 
means of finance or material support, or activities of foreign, international, 
or domestic terrorist groups or individuals or threats posed by such groups 
or individuals to the United States, United States persons, or United States 
interests, or those of other nations, or to communications between such 
groups or individuals, or to the same information relating to groups or 
individuals reasonably believed to be assisting or associated with them.
(v) The term “information” as it relates to a threat of “use of weapons of 
mass destruction” means all information relating to conventional explosive 
weapons and non-conventional weapons capable of causing mass 
casualties and damage, including chemical, biological, radiological, and 
nuclear agents and weapons and the means of delivery of such weapons.
(N) A petition for disclosure pursuant to Rule 6(e)(3)(I) or Rule 6(e)(3)(J) 
shall be ruled upon by the judge designated in subparagraph (O)(i) within 
forty-eight (48) hours of its filing.  Any review of a denial of such a petition 
shall be conducted as expeditiously as possible. 
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(O) A notice of disclosure pursuant to Rule 6(e)(3)(D) or a petition for 
disclosure pursuant to Rule 6(e)(3)(I) or Rule 6(e)(3)(J) shall be filed in the 
district where the grand jury convened. 
(i)  The Chief Judge for each district shall designate one judge serving 
within the district and one alternate to review such notices and hear such 
petitions for a term of three years.  If a petition is denied, the court shall 
immediately provide for the record a written statement of each reason for 
its decision.  On motion of the United States, the record shall be 
transmitted, under seal, to the court of review established in Rule 
6(e)(3)(O)(ii).  
(ii)  The Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court shall publicly 
designate three judges, one of whom shall be publicly designated as the 
presiding judge, from each United States Court of Appeal who together 
shall comprise a court of review which shall have jurisdiction to review 
the denial of any petition within its Circuit under these subdivisions.  If a 
court of review determines that the application was properly denied, the 
court shall immediately provide for the record a written statement of each 
reason for its decision and, on petition of the United States for a writ of 
certiorari, the record shall be transmitted under seal to the Supreme Court, 
which shall have jurisdiction to review such decision.
(iii)  The record of proceedings under Rule 6(e)(3)(O) including notices 
filed, petitions made, and orders granted, shall be maintained under 
security measures established by the Chief Justice in consultation with the 
Attorney General and the Director of Central Intelligence.
This amendment would preserve the best features of the PATRIOT intelligence 
exception, the Homeland Security exception, and the information-sharing guidelines issued by 
the Attorney General.  It recognizes the need for and right of prosecutors to share grand-jury 
materials relating to substantial threats to the United States and its people.  The pre-9/11 version 
of Rule 6(e) was lacking in that it failed to provide for situations in which the need for secrecy is 
outweighed by a need to protect against terrorism and other hostile acts.386  Congress did not err 
in seeking to rectify this flaw.
Congress did err in completely excluding the courts from the decision-making process
and in completely ignoring the societal interest in grand jury secrecy.  Proposed Rule 6(e)(3)(D) 
386
 The omission of an exception for the disclosure of intelligence information is understandable.  Warfare has 
changed dramatically.  Until recent years, it was unimaginable that the United States would face the type of terrorist 
attacks on the home front that now seem all too probable.
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allows prosecutors to act unilaterally when an imminent, substantial threat exists.  When time is 
of the essence to prevent harm, prosecutors are empowered to act.  The definitions found in Rule 
6(e)(3)(M) should help prosecutors identify the types of situations in which this power should be 
invoked, and the reporting requirement found in proposed Rule 6(e)(3)(D)(iii) should help 
prevent prosecutors from abusing this power.
When no imminent threat exists, the proposed amendment affords courts the opportunity 
to undertake the traditional, constitutional balancing analysis to determine whether a 
particularized need for disclosure exists in this instance and whether that need outweighs 
society’s interest in maintaining grand jury secrecy.387  Proposed Rule 6(e)(3)(I) permits 
judicially-approved disclosure of substantial threats to the nation’s security,388 and proposed 
Rule 6(e)(3)(J) permits judicially-approved disclosure of significant intelligence information.389
The need for heightened security is addressed in Rule 6(e)(3)(0) by the appointment of  a 
special judge within each district and a special panel within each circuit to handle notices and 
petitions filed pursuant to the new exceptions.  Not only does the appointment of this special 
court permit heightened security, it also creates a corps of judges with special expertise in this 
area.390  The need for a rapid decision is dealt with in Rule 6(e)(3)(N), which requires a decision 
within forty-eight hours of the filing of a petition.  
In short, the proposed amendment would provide the benefit of protecting national
security interests without the heavy cost of destroying the secrecy so crucial to the functioning of 
the grand jury.
V.   Conclusion
387 See generally supra notes 243 to 292 and accompanying text.
388
 Proposed Rule 6(e)(3)(D) and proposed Rule 6(e)(3)(I) replace the Homeland Security exception. 
389
 Propose Rule 6(e)(3)(J) replaces the PATRIOT intelligence exception.
390
 Such judges should be provided with specialized training.
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In creating the PATRIOT intelligence exception and the Homeland Security exception, 
Congress acted with the best of intentions.  It sought to spare our nation the horror of another 
9/11.  But in the words of Justice Brandeis, 
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the 
government's purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to 
repel  invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to 
liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without 
understanding.391
In its zeal to protect our security, Congress created laws which endanger our liberty.  
Both the PATRIOT intelligence exception and the Homeland Security exception violate the 
Grand Jury Clause of the Fifth Amendment.392  Constitutional questions aside, these exceptions 
are quite simply bad public policy—they needlessly destroy the indispensable grand jury secrecy 
that has been relied upon for almost one thousand years.393
The end of grand jury secrecy alone would not bring the Republic to its knees, but the 
destruction of this right must be viewed as part of a pattern.  With one stroke of the presidential 
pen, Americans arguably lost a right older than the nation itself.  Countless other rights were also 
impacted by the enactment of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 and the Homeland Security Act of 
2002.  This silent erosion of our civil rights is frightening and dangerous.  In times of national 
crisis we must be even more vigilant in protecting the basic rights on which our nation was built.  
Congress can do its part to protect national security and to protect these basic rights by 
revisiting Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e).  With careful drafting, Congress can produce 
a rule that strengthens national security while preserving the grand jury system.  The goals of 
liberty and security are not and should never be viewed as mutually exclusive.  
391 Olmstead v. U.S.  277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
392 See supra notes 302 to 320 and 359 to 371.
393 See supra notes 321 to 356 and 372 to 384.
